H-ASIA: H-Net list for Asian History and Culture <H-ASIA@H-NET.MSU.EDU>
August 14, 1999
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From: Evgeny TORCHINOVI doubt that we can treat contemporary PRC as a purely Communist state. My experience in the Soviet Union and its comparison with what I have seen in China between 1990-1999 assured me that Communist doctrine and ideological slogans in China are but a decoration veiling reality of another kind. I suppose that China is slowly moving towards a modernized (but not Westernized) society with traditionalistic orientations and values. The Communist Party of China looks much more like a kind of contemporary mandarinate than a Marxist-Leninist ruling party.
In China (which I visited for the first time in 1990), I was greatly surprised by a kind of religious freedom unknown in the USSR before Gorbachev's "perestroika". E.g., crowds of people (including youths) in the Buddhist temples during the New Year (Chunjie) holidays, Daoist and Buddhist monks and nuns participating in the academic conferences, religious books in the state bookstores (and academic editions in the bookstores of the temples and monasteries), etc. The appearance of the Russian Orthodox Church priests on the TV screens in 1987-1988 was a sign of great changes in the Soviet society. But the Chinese became much more liberal in their treatment of traditional religious organizations much earlier.
About the case of Falungong / Falun Dafa it can be said that the PRC government inherited the Chinese imperial (especially Qing Dynasty) hostile attitude towards syncretic religious sects and secret societies. And the abolition of Falungong is but another argument for the traditionally Chinese character of the PRC political system as an heir to the Chinese imperial dynasties.
Evgeny Torchinov, Professor, Ph.D., DSc.
Department of Oriental Philosophy and Cultural Studies Chair
Faculty of Philosophy, St. Petersburg State University
Russia
fax/tel.: (7)(812)526-2947
e-mail: blade@comset.net
URL: http://www.tripod.members.com/~etor_best/ie4.html
H-ASIA
August 13, 1999
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From: Jian-Zhong Lin (linjz@ecsu.ctstateu.edu)I sometimes share Thomas Bartlett's frustration that China does not have a political system like the ones we have in the west. But both my wife's and my families are still in China, we travel back there fairly regularly, and we find people there no more distressed about their government than my neighbors and my students here in Connecticut about ours. So, most of the time, I am willing to leave it to the Chinese people living in China to sort out their problems and trust that they will be able to move ahead in the direction that they think is right.
Mr. Cao Siyuan, Director of Siyuan Consultancy in Beijing, predicted in his keynote speech at a conference in North Carolina last May that the Chinese Communist Party will change its name to the Chinese Socialist Party in 10-20 years. That, of course, means that the Lenninist style of government which annoys so many of us will have to leave the political arena. Some of us may recall that Mr. Cao was among the first newsworthy persons to have been arrested after Tiananmen massacre because he had drafted up a letter to condemn the massacre and had been able to get signatures from quite a few members of the National People's Congress. He had to spend one year in the infamous Qincheng Prison. But he has remained a fearless critic and a clear-headed analyst in China. Anyway, pay attention to his itenerary if you are interested because he travels to North America and Europe at intervals to give speeches. Or, if you have a budget, invite him over. He has very interesting--and well supported--observations about China that may help the pessimists live a happier life.
Naomi Standen hit the bull's eye when she suggested that we may do better trying to figure out why we are still unable to understand China instead of fretting over why China has not turned into a junior U.S.A. or junior Australia. I was in Holland last week and loved the country's road system which has separate paths for cars, bikes, and pedestrians. In my Connecticut neighborhood, we only have very narrow two-lane routes for automobiles. Cyclists and joggers share the roads at their own risk. We complain about our roads, but we are willing to live with what we have. The Dutch do not seem to feel the urge to impose on Eastern Connecticut their superior road system which could save some lives and improve the quality of life. Likewise, if the Chinese people--in general--feel comfortable with their political system for the moment, I don't see any point in us losing sleep over it.
Jian-Zhong Lin
English Department
Eastern CT State University
H-ASIA
August 14, 1999
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From: "Lawrence T. McDonnell" (trixie@ksts.seed.net.tw)With respect to Professor Lin, different sorts of jogging paths and different degrees of political democracy are not equivalent. Dodging cars when I go running here in Kaohsiung is eminently preferable to dodging tanks in Beijing. Some Chinese, as Professor Lin notes, are content merely to gripe about the government in private or just ignore it. Good thing: to do anything more may land you in a prison cell for a dozen years. Surely this is nothing to lose sleep over!
In ten or twenty years, says Mr. Cao, the Communist Party will change its name, and then just watch. This shows a splendidly Confucian faith in the power of names which I doubt many Westerners will take much faith in in this age of disinformation. It is not the communism _per se_ many would object to, in any case. It's the lack of political freedom. Saying that freedom is an internal matter, as Professor Lin would have it, is the straight party line. Sorry, human rights and political liberties are everyone's concern, and no jogging anecdotes are going to move them from the top of the agenda.
And people wonder why the Taiwanese insist that there are two Chinas!?
H-ASIA
August 15, 1999
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From: "Thomas C. Bartlett" (T.Bartlett@latrobe.edu.au)Jian-zhong Lin's offer of solidarity and solace, in the face of the latest depressing spectacle provided by Lenin's heirs in China, is comforting but so undeserved that I almost feel reproached by the kindness.
At risk of perhaps seeming callously unsympathetic, I must say that I don't recognize myself as suffering from "frustration that China does not have a political system like the ones we have in the west (sic)." I wouldn't presume to tell the Chinese how to run their country, but I thank Mr. Lin for assuring me, in case I had any doubts about it, that the Chinese are as content with their government now as Americans in his neighborhood are with theirs.
Mr. Lin advises us to focus on the hope that within 10 to 20 years the Communist Party will rename itself the Chinese Socialist Party, AND that its doing so, "of course, means that the Lenninist (sic) style of government which annoys so many of us will have to leave the political arena." Somehow I sense that there's more at stake here than just nomenclature and style. If that's all that changes, it will be yet one more case of "the more it changes, the more it remains the same".
One purpose of floating this idea now is evidently to offer hope for "reunification" with Taiwan, since "socialism" is often said to be the guiding principle of Sun Yat-sen's thought, thus a common ground underlying both Nationalists and Communists. (But people in China today appear unwilling to contemplate the notion that Tawian may have transcended that model.) Leninism in China will be abandoned in name when enough of the older generation of high ranking pensioned veterans of Liberation have joined Marx and Mao. The younger generation want China to be at the leading edge of global trends and Marxism is an embarrassing liability internationally these days; Jiang Zemin's ideological cohorts abroad are not a reassuring lot: Fidel Castro, Kim Jong Il, and the "ungrateful" Vietnamese. But changing the name doesn't mean at all that China's fundamental political culture will change out of its historic patterns. That is, there will surely be no nonsense about democratic freedoms; the lesson taken by China from the USSR's collapse is that separatist ethnic minorities and "splittists" will inevitably demand independence as soon as free speech is allowed.
So maybe within 10 to 20 years we'll see in China an ideological movement attempting to synthesize somehow the "scientific" outlook of socialism with the "vital force" of "Chinese tradition", represented by the meditators' faith in "qi4". How else can the Party answer the challenge of rampant disbelief in its doctrines, except by reinventing itself? From that mix of ideas will emerge a modern reincarnation of Dong Zhongshu, the famous synthesizer of Confucian doctrines with naturalist philosophies in the Han dynasty. Dong flourished just after the half century of economic recovery under the so-called "laissez-faire" emperors Wen and Jing, whose reigns followed an attempted coup d'etat by the founder's empress. (Sound familiar?)
Dong's great patron was the Martial Emperor, Wudi, who saved the dynasty from fragmentation into regional princedoms and civil war, by using the pretext of foreign threats to suppress domestic opposition while launching massive assaults on external enemies. Under the Martial Emperor the Chinese imperial state attained that flexible balance of harsh Legalist structure and humane (first Confucian, later Buddhist, then Neo-Confucian) justification, which were its enduring characteristics for much of two millenia. Will the renamed and restyled Chinese Socialist Party be headed by a new Martial Emperor and a new Dong Zhongshu early in the next millennium?
Thomas Bartlett
Latrobe University
Melbourne, Australia
H-ASIA
August 19, 1999
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From: Jian-Zhong Lin (linjz@ecsu.ctstateu.edu)Reality in China, I believe, is very different from what Mr. McDonnell imagines it to be.
For Mr. McDonnell's information, I do not regard human rights to be an internal matter. We have no disagreement over which system is preferrable, but we have differences in how to view and resolve a conflict when a conflict arises. Anyone who believes in democracy, I would think, would be willing to listen to those who are more immediately affected by a political change. Believing in the intelligence of the Chinese people in the choice of their political system seems to me to be consistent with democratic principles.
Having said that, I would like to digress somewhat to Mr. McDonnell's dodging preferences: I trust that dodging tanks must be a hair-raising experience, but dodging cars--I would think--can be just as nerve-recking. It is doubtful that you are likely to come out much better being embraced by a car as opposed to being hit by a tank. So, please keep a keen eye on the traffic in Kaohsiung when you go jogging. Your freedom to enjoy the sights and sounds and air of Kaohsiung is proportional to your willingness to observe traffic rules and to watch out for unruly drivers.
Many of us--including me--dislike the Chinese government for one reason or another but we should not allow our biases to block us from seeing what has been happening in China. Yes, the Communist Party is doing what it can to hang on to the power in its hands but it also understands that the political system it subscribes to is outdated and has to be either abandoned or overhauled sooner or later. Democratic elections have been going on for well over a decade on large scales at the village and township level which serves as a training ground to the Chinese people for democratic participation at higher levels. The Atlanta-based Carter Center has been observing Chinese elections for quite some time and has been very positive about them. If you have had opportunities visiting China and you don't confine yourself to a particular circle, you already know that political criticism is open and daring, and it is well tolerated as long as you don't get it published outside China. Of course, we in the west don't like that kind of censorship and we can spend days condemning the pratice of "no negative publication outside China" but the general public in China does not regard it as an unpardonable sin although a sin they deem that it is.
The Chinese people, in fact, are not content with what they have-- ulike what Mr. McDonnell has suggested. They, as I have suggested, have chosen to live with what they have for the moment. They would like to arrive at democracy sooner rather than later, but they also understand that moving from one direction to another takes time. They saw what happened to the former Soviet Union when the political system was changed without a sound infrastructure. That is not to say that they are nostalgic about the Soviet system. They are not. But they would like the change in China to be as smooth as possible so that common people like them would not have to go through what common people in Russia today have to go through. The Chinese government has been able to stay in power partly because it understands--and it takes advantage of--people's wish for stability. When evaluating changes in China, we should guard ourselves against demanding instant gratification as we in the west have a tendency to do in many aspects of life.
Mr. McDonnell may choose to be indifferent to a possible name change by the Chinese Communist Party. But most conference participants who heard Mr. Cao with their own ears think of it as something earth-shaking. As I have suggested in the past, the Chinese Communist Party understands that what the party ideology propagates is not what the people are interested in hearing. But for the moment--a period of 10 to 20 years perhaps--the party sees no reasonable option than hanging on to the old stuff. When the party abandons its name, it also announces a new political belief and a new approach to power. That will surely turn a new leaf in the history of Chinese politics. From what I know about China and the Chinese people, I have very strong confidence in the outcome being positive.
The Chinese government's practice of locking up certain political dissidents is certainly objectionable. We should voice our objections whenever we wish. However, if we dwell on it exclusively, we run the risk of losing sight of a much larger picture. Not a few of my African-American students believe that our government has an unwritten policy to promote crime and poverty in their neighborhoods as a means to contain their population. Many of us would disagree with them. But if we look at life through their perspectives, human rights situation in our own country is not that encouraging, either. I wonder whether anyone has done a comparative study of Chinese prisoners and American prisoners to see what percentage of them think of themselves as political prisoners. We Americans are just as much entitled to human rights as they Chinese do. To advocate and practice a policy which gives one group preference over another seems unconscionable to me. To attempt to impose our system--which has so much problem of its own--on a people who are fully capable of making their own choices is at best irresponsible.
Coming back to Mr. McDonnell's analogy: to me, being killed by a New York policeman or an Ohio National Guardsman is just as bad as being killed by a Beijing policeman or a PLA soldier. In other words, being flattened by a car is no more enjoyable than being flattened by a tank. Human rights is an international issue. We should not develop a tunnel vision when we promote human rights.
Jian-Zhong Lin
English Department
Eastern CT State University
H-ASIA
August 19, 1999
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From: Jian-Zhong Lin (linjz@ecsu.ctstateu.edu)My earlier reply to Mr. McDonnell applies to Mr. Bartlett's current piece as well. I will only add a few notes.
First, sticking to stereotypes may help sustain an argument. But they won't help clarifying issues in discussion. The Communist Party of China is already a very different party than it was a few years ago and it keeps changing as time and party membership change. To keep on believing that "the more it changes, the more it remains the same" does little more to one than raising one's blood pressure level and strengthening one's political blindness.
Second, a willingness to examine issues from different perspectives is a basic requirement for anyone serious about academic issues. I demonstrated my political preference a few years ago by choosing to be an American citizen instead of a Chinese one. But that should not and does not prevent me from attempting to view the Chinese situation from the eyes of common Chinese people such as my parents, their neighbors and former colleagues, as well as my friends. Distrusting a government is healthy; disbelieving people is not.
And finally, I am all thankful to Mr. Bartlett for catching my misspelling. Hey, being in the company of our former vice president Dan Quayle (spelling?) is actually quite a pleasure.
Cheers!
Jian-Zhong Lin
English Department
Eastern CT State University
H-ASIA
August 21, 1999
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From: "Thomas C. Bartlett" (T.Bartlett@latrobe.edu.au)Jian-zhong Lin caricatures my comments about Chinese historical poltical culture, calling them stereotypes, which is one of the most frequently abused words in the language; it literally means "rigid category". Presumably categories are unavoidable in thinking, but it's the rigidity that's undesirable. So I have proposed a word, "plastotype", meaning "flexible category", as an aid to thought.
By making this reference to stereotypes, Mr. Lin apparently criticizes my suggestion that the logic of China's past continues to exert strong influence in China's present. But I do think that modern Chinese political culture is determined by factors more fundamental than the membership of the Communist Party. So I think the notion of "history" can be a useful plastotype for summarizing those factors, particularly since Americans, evidently including Mr. Lin, are so prone to ignore this dimension. The historical character of the Chinese polity undoubtedly exerts great weight on modern China. Historical precdents at many levels exert an influence on modern Chinese leaders that would astonish many Western statesmen. Certain problems of maintaining such a centralized bureaucratic state are perennial, and the culture is deeply configured around habitual means of solving those problems. The Three Gorges Dam project is a fascinating case in point; Karl Wittfogel must be spinning in his grave.
I will support this emphasis on history as a determinant of Chinese political culture by reference to a remark that I have occasionally heard when speaking with Chinese people. It's apparently well known in China that Americans often speak of their country as a nation of immigrants, and with proud and positive implication. But in China, this American self-identification is sometimes given an added interpretation, that there's no such thing as a "real" American; whatever is impressive in America really originated somewhere else. I contrast that outlook with the political and cultural attitude underlying China's decision to deny Chinese citizenship to people whose families have lived in Hong Kong for several generations and now have no other home, but whose ancestors were not Chinese.
Let's hope that political developments in China do turn out as benignly as Mr. Lin has bravely projected, so many years into the future. He's not the only one who has a personal interest in such developments. Things have certainly improved in the last two decades, but our evaluation of that improvement must be made remembering the extraordinarily low baseline from which it began in 1979.
Mr. Lin's closing reference to Dan Quayle is a master stroke of subtle implication. Actually, I voted for Perot in '92.
Thomas Bartlett
Melbourne, Australia
H-ASIA
August 25, 1999
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From: Jian-Zhong Lin (linjz@ecsu.ctstateu.edu)I was going to "retire" from posting in H-Asia in order to get ready for the new semester, but I feel obligated at this point to say something so that I may pay due respect to all who have responded to me openly and privately.
First of all, I have always maintained that the current Chinese political system is undesirable but tolerable. It is my educated prediction that it is moving in a direction that the Chinese people will like better and that the outcome will be positive. But as Professor Bartlett has pointed out, it is not going to be a "Democracy" in the Western sense. Most Westerners regard Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as democracies, but even in these places, it is not difficult to find in the respective political system what we will recognize as undemocratic. The Chinese leadership has shown great interest in the Singaporean model. Interested readers may want to take at look in that direction.
Secondly, democracy itself is not a deterrant to nationalistic Chauvinism and/or expansionism. National interest, for a long time to come, will determine a nation's behavior. My own country, the U.S., is a case in point. The federal government sent out tanks (or was it just one tank?) against the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and forced the Montana Freemen to surrender when each group represented a threat to federal authority. Internationally, our government likes democracy so much that it is happy to send out marines and, more recently, cruise missiles to persuade those who should disagree. Don't expect China to act any differently when it perceives its national interest to be at risk. As to the situation across Taiwan Strait, I suggested three years ago here in H-Asia when we were discussing the Chinese missile testing over the Taiwan Strait and I will suggest again that Chinese troops would have already been all over Taiwan were China a democracy because that would have been the demand of the Chinese people. China regards Taiwan and Tibet as its territory as the U.S. does Hawaii and Texas. My view is that Taiwan or Tibet has as much chance of becoming independent as Hawaii or Texas does. Nothing is going to change that. If you think otherwise, get on an airplane to China and find out for yourself.
Now, I am really going to retire.
Jian-Zhong Lin
English Department
Eastern CT State University
H-ASIA
August 28, 1999
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From: John Mensing (JMensing@compuserve.com)
Subject: H-ASIA: Falun Gong - impressions from TianjinAlthough Hawaii and Texas both enjoy proud traditions distinguishing themselves from their federal government ("Lone Star" beer calls itself "The National Beer of Texas" on its label), these traditions are hardly as contiguous with Tibet and Taiwan as Prof. Jian-Zhong Lin would have us believe. The situation in Tibet -- where over 100,000 refugees have fled to India, and more now risk their lives to flee a government which continues to decline in popularity among the indigenous residents -- finds no parallels in these states. Although Taiwan, like Hawaii, lies outside of the mainland, comparisons between the political relations, standing armies, and economies also do not support such a facile analogy.
The defining characteristic of Chinese government culture which other nations and cultures have the right to feel most threatened by (aside from the explicit threats which the Government levels against the U.S., Japan, Russia, etc. when it routinely labels these countries as "the enemy of China", or, alternately, "the No. 1 enemy of China"), and which observers of China have an obligation to comprehend, is its reliance on nationalistic and ethnic chauvinism. Prof. Lin's observation that, "democracy itself is not a deterrent to nationalistic Chauvinism and/or expansionism" approaches this point. However, Lin's premise, that, "National interest, for a long time to come, will determine a nation's behavior," begs the question of how national interest is to be defined, and, since it does not permit national interest to be but one of the factors which influence national behaviour, becomes a framework for circular reasoning.
Some current Chinese government press spokesmen and diplomatic personnel now claim that their country is already a democracy, while others maintain that it is clearly evolving in that direction. Observers of China frequently use the democratic axis in their analyses, and the idea, however one delineates it, must stand near the top of the list of notions with a record of popular appeal among Chinese subjects. Democracy is still prescribed as an antidote to Party excess, and the market economy continues to be identified as a precursor to democracy. These touchstones of political science risk becoming bromides, however, if national identity is not added as a separate, albeit interactive, factor. Perceptions of China as democratic/authoritarian and/or capitalist/communist will continue to mislead when they do not also incorporate a nationalistic/multi-cultural vector. The suppression of the Falun Gong discipline (I have to confess some bias here as my Qi Gong teacher in China was a member of a similar grouping) has been seen as evidence of less democracy and more totalitarianism. In addition, one could view its suppression as the action of a government increasingly chary of allowing popular culture to be defined outside its classrooms.
John Mensing
Independent Scholar
Hiroshima, Japan