

A Sociological Analysis of the 2006 Elections*

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The extent and persistence of post-electoral conflict imply that the Mexico that voted in 2006 has deep social divisions. Certainly the rhetoric of the failed contender, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, suggests a nation with deep cleavages between the haves and the have-nots. If indeed there are deep cleavages dividing Mexicans, they may be based in divisions revolving around social class or other demographic differences, such as ethnicity, gender, generation, or region. Alternatively, they may reflect preferences about regime principles or fundamental policy positions that do not map neatly onto social differences.

In the pivotal 2000 presidential election in which Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) brought an end to the long rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), regime-based differences predominated over social class, ethnicity, region, or other sociological categories (Moreno 2003; Magaloni and Poiré 2004; Klesner 2005). However, with the end of the PRI's rule, the reasons for the regime-based cleavage in Mexican politics have dissipated. In this chapter I adopt the perspective that the regime-based differences no longer structure Mexican electoral behavior in the way they did in the dozen years before 2000 (Molinar Horcasitas 1991; Domínguez and McCann 1996; Moreno 1998; Klesner 2005). Instead, I explore the sociological bases of partisan choice in 2006. Can we find major social differences among the voter bases of López Obrador, President Felipe Calderón, and the failed PRI nominee, Roberto Madrazo? Did

socioeconomic, ethnic, gender, age, religious, or regional characteristics of the electorate and individual voters drive vote choice in 2006?

In other words, this chapter seeks to determine which sorts of people supported which candidates in 2006. I limit my analysis to the sociological bases of vote choice since other contributors to this project will explore more extensively attitudinal and political factors driving voter decisions. I rely on the Mexico 2006 Panel Study as the principal source of data about electoral choice in July 2006, but I supplement that panel survey with exit poll results and aggregate data analysis based at the county (*municipio*) level.

Who Voted for Whom?

Using the exit poll conducted by the newspaper, *Reforma*,¹ Table 1 reports simple cross-tabulations between respondents' self-reported vote choice in the presidential election and several basic socioeconomic and demographic variables.

Table 1 about here

From these figures, Mexico appears to have a gender gap. López Obrador polled much more strongly among men than women, although the differences are small – Calderón received less than 2% more votes from women than men while López Obrador's gender gap was about 5%. Notably, in the recent past, Mexican men have been more willing to vote against the president's party than Mexican women. In 2000, for instance, men were more likely to vote for Fox, while women opted disproportionately for the PRI's Francisco Labastida (Klesner 2001, 110). As elsewhere, women in Mexico have also been less likely to vote for the Left.

In terms of the age profile of his supporters, Calderón continued Vicente Fox's trend of performing well in age groups other than the elderly. PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo, not surprisingly, performed best among voters over age 50, suggesting that the PRI base continues to age and that its decline probably has as much to do with the generational replacement of PRI stalwarts as anything else. Among the respondents in the national sample of Wave 3 of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study, the average Madrazo voter was nearly four years older than the mean Calderón supporter ($t=2.57$, $p=0.01$) and about three years older than the average López Obrador voter ($t=1.92$, $p=0.06$). In contrast to his rivals, López Obrador did no better and no worse among the young than the old. This relatively widespread support across age groups mirrors López Obrador's relative success across different categories on the various socioeconomic variables explored here.

Moving to these factors, we see that Calderón vote share rises steadily as we ascend the income brackets; he clearly polled better among higher-income groups than with poorer voters, gaining less than a third of the votes of those making under 4,000 pesos (US\$400) monthly but almost half of the ballots of those earning more than 9,200 pesos (almost US\$1,000) monthly. By contrast, Madrazo gained votes disproportionately from the poor, as has been the case for PRI candidates for many years (Klesner 2005). Despite his special campaign appeals to the poor, López Obrador gathered votes at similar rates across all income groups, with the possible exception of the very richest Mexicans. These findings mirror those for education: a strong positive relationship between education and voting for Calderón emerges, while a powerfully inverse relationship between education level and vote share for Madrazo is clear. Again, López

Obrador polled well across all educational levels. In terms of educational background, Calderón and López Obrador voters do not differ significantly ($t=0.36$, $p=0.78$).

The PRI has had a long relationship with organized labor (Middlebrook 1995), while the PAN has not. However, in the *Reforma* exit poll, neither Calderón nor Madrazo polled differently among the small segment of unionized families than among those with no union associations.² Despite his populist rhetoric, López Obrador too received votes in almost the same proportions from union and non-union families. Of course, as organized labor has withered, this population segment is growing smaller and smaller.

Although religious issues have been at the root of much violent conflict in post-independence Mexico, in recent decades religion has not been central in shaping the major issues on the public agenda. As Bruhn and Greene (2007, this volume) argue, although the party elites for the PAN and the PRD are quite divided on moral issues like abortion, these topics did not mobilize public opinion in the campaign. That said, the PAN has clearly identified itself as pro-Catholic since its founding (Mabry 1974; Loeza 1999). Bishops have become increasingly willing to speak out on political positions over the past two decades, mainly in promoting participation and democratization (Chand 2001), but to a lesser extent in favor of particular parties.³ In 2006, church-going Catholics were more likely to vote for Calderón than were Protestants, those with no religion, and those who rarely attend religious services. López Obrador, meanwhile, did especially well among the non-religious, although again this is a small segment of the population.

The *Reforma* exit poll does not include data on respondents' ethnicities, so to explore the effects of skin color, I rely on the Mexico 2006 Panel Study.⁴ Among respondents to the post-election wave of the panel study, 48% of those classified by the interviewer as white supported Calderón, whereas white Mexicans showed considerably less enthusiasm for either of his main opponents—14% chose Madrazo and 27% opted for López Obrador. Notably, Madrazo did well among darker-skinned Mexicans, indicating that the PRI continues to pull its votes disproportionately from the millions of Mexicans of indigenous heritage. Again, these figures suggest that Calderón's support comes disproportionately from upper social strata, the PRI's from lower social strata, and López Obrador's from across social groups.

In short, Calderón drew votes disproportionately from the “new” Mexico – younger, the better educated, and those with higher income; the PRI vote remains concentrated among the less educated, the poor, the old, and those living in rural areas. Both the PRD and the PAN are urban-based parties. Observant Catholics tend to vote for the PAN, while the party does poorly among the non-religious, who support the PRD. One important difference is that women apparently felt more comfortable voting for Calderón than for López Obrador. So although there is some evidence of class and religion shaping vote decisions, particularly for the PAN and the PRI, the part of the electorate supporting López Obrador's PRD cannot be clearly understood in class terms.

Social context

If individual characteristics of voters do not yield many significant differences between those who chose Calderón and those who supported López Obrador, could their social contexts have provided the cues that led to their decisions? The Mexico 2006

Panel Study includes a series of demographic and socioeconomic indicators for the counties and townships (*localidades*) in which the respondents reside. Table 2 provides the mean scores on these indicators for the locations in which those who voted for Calderón, Madrazo, and López Obrador live. It also reports difference of means tests for the contrasts between the three major candidates.

The means and t-tests reported in Table 2 parallel the finding from individual-level data. Here we see that López Obrador drew voters from more densely populated areas than Calderón and Madrazo. This result is in part an artifact of López Obrador's strength in Mexico City, but the PRD vote is nevertheless concentrated in urban areas. PRI support is concentrated in the least densely populated counties, which confirms the "green" (rural) vote noted in Table 1. We also find that Madrazo's voters were more concentrated in areas with a higher share of the workforce in the primary sector and a lower share in the services sector. Calderón did significantly better in localities where the workforce was more heavily employed in manufacturing and construction (the secondary sector) than did López Obrador.

Table 2 about here

Even though López Obrador performed especially well in densely populated counties, he also did much better than his rivals among those living in localities with higher proportions of speakers of indigenous languages. Although the literacy rate in localities in which Calderón voters live is higher than those where his opponents' supporters reside, the difference is very small. Average years of schooling in localities where PAN voters live is not significantly different from what holds for López Obrador's

supporters, although PRI voters tend to reside in localities with somewhat lower years of education completed.

An important indicator of the greater material security of the communities where Calderón voters are found is the higher percentage of residents who are covered by health insurance—state provided or privately acquired—in those localities. Also, of the three main candidates, the supporters of López Obrador live in the localities with the lowest percentage of households receiving remittances from abroad (mostly the United States). At the individual level, the panel data indicate that Calderón did best among those with relatives living in the United States.

Overall, then, this analysis of socioeconomic context reinforces what we know of voters at the individual level. Important patterns of both difference and similarity emerge between Calderón and López Obrador, with the former's voters living in more materially secure communities in which the workforce is more engaged in the secondary sector. The latter drew votes more successfully from panel respondents who lived in localities with more speakers of indigenous languages, an indicator of ethnicity. The PRI, or at least Madrazo,⁵ remains relatively successful in more backward parts of Mexico—that is, less densely populated, heavily agricultural areas with lower levels of education.

Regionalism

A prevalent line of analysis posits a “blue / yellow” divide that geographically divides Mexico, much akin to the “red state / blue state” divide” popular in media accounts of recent U.S. elections.⁶ In this view, illustrated in Figure 1, the nation separates into northern, *blue* Mexico, where Calderón won most states and southern,

yellow Mexico where López Obrador carried most states.⁷ The central problem with this perspective is it allows no place for the green-and-red of the PRI. PRI congressional candidates performed much better than their standard-bearer, with the PRI and its coalition partner taking 28.2% of the popular vote nationally (compared to 29.0% for the PRD-led coalition's candidates and 33.4% for the PAN). The PRI also governs a majority (17) of Mexican states, including every border state except Baja California and the southern states, other than Morelos and Yucatán (PAN) and Guerrero and Chiapas (PRD).

Figures 1 and 2 about here

Figure 2 offers a more complex vision of regionalism in the 2006 election, using results for the Chamber of Deputies races to chart patterns of party competition. Where a party won by a margin of greater than 15%, I placed the state in a one-party dominance category. Where no more than 15 points separate the first and the third parties, I treated it as a zone of three-party competition. Otherwise, I categorized the states by the two parties that competed for first and second place. Here we still see regionalism, but a much more variegated version.⁸ The PAN dominates the center-west region, Mexico's "Bible Belt", and it competes against the PRI in the northern states; many races in that region remained very close, even with a weak PRI presidential candidate. The PRD dominates the Federal District and Michoacán, and it competes hard with the PRI in the southern states of Guerrero, Chiapas, and Tabasco (the home state of both Madrazo and López Obrador). Most of the other states now see three-party competition. In gubernatorial elections held since July 2006, the PRD beat the PRI by a whisker in

Chiapas but lost Tabasco to the PRI; the PAN lost Yucatán to the PRI. In other words, all three parties remain serious electoral competitors.

At the state level, then, Mexico is not so easily divided into blue and yellow. PAN or PRD activists are not necessarily struggling primarily against each other, but against their old nemesis, the PRI. Consequently, more complex patterns of cooperation and competition may emerge. Before 2000, for instance, the PRD and the PAN often cooperated to support candidates in the state and local elections to oust the PRI; even today, they belong to the same anti-PRI electoral coalition in Oaxaca. In the immediate aftermath of the 2006 election, the PAN has courted the PRI as a national governing partner by supporting its candidates in the Chiapas and Tabasco gubernatorial elections.

To be sure, the PRI is losing position everywhere compared to its glorious past – even compared to its performance in state-level elections during the middle years of Fox’s term. The only major regions that are not competitive today are not those where the PRI still dominates but rather where the PRD and the PAN have established a new hegemony. In national races, however, Mexican voters everywhere still have more than two choices.

Ticket splitters and converts

Voters sometimes take advantage of those choices by splitting their ballots—about one in five voters split their ballot between presidential and Chamber of Deputies votes, and about one in four did so between presidential and Senate votes. These voters offer insight into which segments of the electorate are most electorally mobile.⁹ Table 3 summarizes the results of the sociological analysis reported in Table 2 when it is applied to those who voted for the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies races in 2006. The first column

shows the characteristics of those who voted for the PRI ticket for the Chamber and for Madrazo—straight ticket voters.¹⁰ The second and third columns show ticket splitters—those who voted for the PRI for the lower house, but not for its presidential candidate. We see some revealing evidence about which PRI voters can be lured away from the party by stronger candidacies, which are more likely to move toward the PAN, and which toward the PRD.

Table 3 about here

PRI stalwarts are older than those who split their ticket and Calderón drew more of the younger ticket splitters than did López Obrador, mirroring the differences among these candidates in the general electorate. Ticket splitters are more likely to live in urban areas than those PRI voters who did not split their ballots. Straight ticket PRI voters are poorer and less educated than those who chose PRI congressional candidates but abandoned Madrazo. Wealthier ticket splitters were more likely to opt for Calderón than López Obrador, although educational differences among them were not significant. Those PRI congressional voters who chose Calderón were also more religious than straight ticket PRI or those splitters who chose López Obrador. In other words, differences between straight ticket PRI supporters and those who divided their ballots mirror the overall sociological bases of partisan support shown in Table 1. They suggest that PRI stalwarts are older, poorer, less educated, and more rural than those who chose Calderón and López Obrador. Younger, more affluent, better-educated, more urban Mexicans who find the PRI to be an attractive electoral option are also more likely to abandon it if they dislike its particular candidates. Splitters' choices between the PAN and PRD also reflect the different social bases of these two parties.

Table 4 about here

Another way to explore the flux in the Mexican electorate is to examine the social characteristics of voters who chose the candidate of one party in 2000 but did not cast ballots for its nominee six years later (see Table 4). Those who stayed with the candidate of the same party in both 2000 and 2006 I label “loyalists,” while those who changed parties I term “defectors.” To simplify the analysis, I do not report all categories of loyalists and defectors in Table 4. The two most significant groups of defectors are Fox voters who moved to López Obrador in 2006—fully one-tenth of all respondents in *Reforma’s* exit poll—and Labastida voters who moved to either the PAN or the PRD candidate—about one in twenty voters. I compare these groups to PAN and PRI loyalists to ascertain whether defectors differ in their social background.

Those who voted for Fox in 2000 but for López Obrador in 2006 were overwhelmingly male. Those who stayed loyal to the PAN were wealthier and more religious. Madrazo lost those who had voted PRI in 2000 who were in the 30-49 age group to both of his rivals. In contrast, older voters remained loyal to him. Those leaving the PRI for Calderón enjoyed higher incomes than PRI loyalists or those who defected to López Obrador and those moving from the PRI to both rival parties were among the most highly educated. Those defecting from the PRI to the PAN were more likely to be Catholic than either PRI loyalists or those moving from Labastida in 2000 to López Obrador in 2006.

This analysis of split-ticket voting and switching of party presidential choices between 2000 and 2006 has the strongest implications for the PRI. Younger, better educated, and higher income Mexicans who were PRI voters even in recent pivotal

elections are now willing to defect to the PAN and the PRD. Many of the same voters will vote for the PRI congressional slate, but they no longer feel obliged to vote straight ticket. Of course, Madrazo was an unusually unattractive candidate who ran an especially bad campaign (see Langston, this volume, and Shirk, this volume), as perhaps was Labastida before him (Klesner 2001). But the PRI no longer has the critical mass of stalwarts to allow it to make those mistakes and remain competitive in presidential politics.

A sociological model of voting

So far, we have focused on simple bivariate relationships – that is, the relationship between any one demographic category and partisan support. What we do not know yet is how these factors operate in a multivariate context. For instance, do northerners disproportionately support the PAN because they are wealthy, or is there something else about living in the North that inclines them toward the PAN? Do women avoid the Left because they are women, or because women are on average are less well-educated and more religious?

What can the official electoral results reported by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) tell us about patterns of support for the parties? Applying the model used in Klesner (2005) to the presidential electoral results (as posted on the IFE's website) we find that the regional concentration of support for the PAN and the PRD has actually intensified. (Appendix 1 shows multiple-regression analysis of county-level data using the model reported in that earlier study applied to the 2006 electoral results.) The unstandardized regression coefficients for the 2006 presidential election are remarkably similar to those of 1997 (Klesner 2005: 112). These findings suggest that the cleavage

structures that manifested themselves in 2006 are not new, but the reemergence of those that had been developing as the PAN and the PRD grew in strength in the 1990s; the 2000 election was an anomaly related to the pivotal nature of that election and to Vicente Fox's effectiveness in priming the issue of "change".

Figures 3 and 4 about here

The analysis of the aggregate data reveals that Calderón performed better in more urban counties where the percentage of Catholics was higher, the population had a higher literacy rate, and a greater share of the labor force worked in the secondary sector. This has been the standard PAN profile for a long time (Barraza and Bizberg 1991; Klesner 1993; 2005; Magaloni and Moreno 2003; Mizrahi 2003). López Obrador, in contrast, did better in counties that are somewhat less urban, where the population is not concentrated in manufacturing and construction, and where there are relatively fewer self-professed Catholics. He, too, won higher vote shares where the population has a higher literacy rate. Finally, in keeping with the PRI's recent experience (Moreno and Méndez 2007), Madrazo did better in more rural counties with a relatively low share of self-professed Catholics where more people were unable to read. The PRI, too, does relatively well in areas where more people are employed in the secondary sector.

Based on the model summarized in Appendix 1, Figures 3 and 4 show the predicted vote percentages that each candidate would win given a particular percentage of the population that is Catholic (Figure 3) or literate (Figure 4). As we can see, the aggregate data model predicts that Calderón would do especially well in areas of the country with higher proportions of self-professed Catholics, whereas López Obrador and Madrazo would have greater success in areas where the population is less devout. In

terms of literacy, only Madrazo loses vote share as literacy levels rise, with López Obrador gaining more rapidly than Calderón.

Table 5 about here

Table 5 shows the predicted values for the PAN, PRD, and PRI candidates by region based on the aggregate data analysis. As the results indicate, Calderón did markedly better in the north and the center-west, *even after controlling for the other demographic variables*. Meanwhile, López Obrador received a vote share much lower in the north and in the center-west than what he received in the south or the center regions, but his greater Mexico City result was considerably higher, again *allowing for the effects of the other variables*. The regional variables display less extreme estimates for Madrazo, especially after controlling for the other variables. Aggregate data, then, largely supports what we have already discovered in our bivariate analysis of individual and contextual variables, as reported in Tables 1 and 2.

County-level data are potentially vulnerable to the “ecological fallacy”, in which aggregate trends are inaccurately applied to individuals. For instance, it may be that support for English as an official language in U.S. counties increases as the percentage of Latinos rises; that does not necessarily mean Latinos favor adopting English as the official language, but rather than Anglos in regions with large numbers of immigrants are much more likely to endorse such a measure than Anglos who never encounter such immigrants.

To investigate this question whether individual voting behavior mirror patterns at the country level, I estimated two versions of a multinomial logit regression model of reported vote choice on the national sample of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study. The first

model used only individual-level variables such as those reported in Table 1, while the second added contextual variables. Appendix Tables A2 and A3 report the coefficients and goodness of fit statistics for these models. Here, for ease of presentation, I simply summarize the results and illustrate the implications of the second model with predicted outcomes based on simulations using Clarify.¹¹ Table 6 thus reports predicted vote shares for the major candidates given that an individual has a particular characteristic (e.g., being female or a member of a union family).

Table 6 about here

Other than region, two differences in support for Calderón and López Obrador stand out: Calderón voters are more likely to be female and wealthy than López Obrador voters.¹² In addition, those residing in localities where a higher percentage of the population is covered by health insurance (a proxy measure for affluence and/or security) were more likely to support the new president, but Calderón did more poorly than his PRD rival among those living in localities with higher levels of education (although the individual-level education measure did not provide a statistically significant contrast). These results yield predicted vote shares (Table 6) that mirror the bivariate relationships illustrated in Table 1 in most respects. At the individual level, *after controlling for the effects of other factors*, voters for the top two contenders do not differ significantly in terms of their age profile, their level of education,¹³ or their religion or religiosity. Figure 5 shows the pronounced differences in the income profiles of Calderón voters, on the one hand, and López Obrador and Madrazo supporters on the other. As income rises, Mexican voters move toward Calderón. Figure 6, in contrast, shows the relatively similar education profiles of those casting ballots for López Obrador and Calderón, and the

severe contrast between their followers and those of Madrazo. These individual level predictions are remarkably similar to the aggregate level predictions displayed in Figure 4.

Figures 5 and 6 about here

Thus, these findings reinforce those from the aggregate data analysis that Calderón and López Obrador voters do not differ significantly in their educational profile. Again, regionalism emerges here as a key explanatory variable just as it did with the ecological analysis. We see from the regional variables at the bottom of Table 6 that Calderón and Madrazo did significantly better in the center, center-west, and especially the north than López Obrador. The PAN and PRI candidates performed significantly worse in the Mexico City metropolitan area than did López Obrador.

A valuable feature of our panel design is that we can explore whether the electoral bases of the candidates changed significantly over the course of the campaign, or at least from October, when the first wave of our panel was administered, and July. The same multinomial logit model used to predict the voting intentions in October 2005 also works well in explaining the actual vote in July 2006 (as reported in Table A2).¹⁴ Calderón began the campaign with significant advantages over López Obrador among women, northerners, and those reporting higher incomes; he faced a serious deficit in Mexico City. Like his party, López Obrador found little support in the north.

The meaning of region

If region is so central to electoral behavior, even controlling for so many other demographic factors, what exactly does “region” signify? First, we could be tapping

deep historical and cultural differences among Mexico's regions. Second, regional voting patterns could reflect the differential impact of socioeconomic modernization and economic integration. Third, regionalism could be an artifact of the emergence of opposition to the former ruling party, which conferred advantages to "first movers" (see Lawson 2006). Finally, it is important to underscore the central argument made by Baker (in this volume) about regionalism: once regional divisions are established, quotidian social intercourse will tend to reinforce patterns of partisan support.

According to the first line of argument, for over a century a distinct northern regionalist way of thinking has stressed that the *north* has a frontier mentality, a can-do spirit, and a much more individualist orientation. Its work ethic, the argument goes, is not shared by the Mexico City-dominated center (which serves a grasping central government) and the south (the domain of lazy Indians).¹⁵ The *center-west* region, the heart of which is the Bajío, Mexico's breadbasket and its most orthodox Catholic region, has been associated with the nation's *charro* or ranch culture – which some identify as *the* uniquely Mexican culture. Yet other observers regard the *south* as the heart of "deep Mexico" (Bonfil Batalla 1996) -- a region where most of its culturally indigenous people still live, but also where poverty rates are by far the highest, people are the most tied to their local villages, and local bosses (*caciques*) associated with the former ruling party exercise most sway.

To the extent that the PAN has adhered to a more individualist philosophy, it may be especially attractive to voters in the north; to the extent that López Obrador's campaign appealed to voters with statist philosophies, it would draw support from the greater Mexico City area (Davis 1994). Evidence from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study

indicates that when given a choice between promoting private investment or depending on the state to provide resources to address poverty, those living in the north and the center-west are much more likely to prefer encouraging private investment, while those in the center, the south, and greater Mexico City are more inclined to tax the rich to give to the poor.

In addition to its focus on democracy, the PAN has also long flirted with Christian Democracy (1974; Middlebrook 2001; Magaloni and Moreno 2003), which may be especially appealing to the Catholics who dominate in the center-west states. The heritage of the Cristero Rebellion of the 1920s – in which Catholic peasants took up arms against a rabidly secular state – has left the Bajío region with a stronger religious identity than other parts of the country. This legacy may lead voters there to punish both the PRI and PRD, whose predecessors prosecuted that war.

Second, the region variable may tap differential impacts of modernization and economic integration. Mexicans living in *northern* states have benefited more from economic integration with the U.S. than those living in other regions, especially the south, where competition with large grain growers from the Midwestern states of the U.S. have pushed many peasant producers off the land or into penury.¹⁶ Those from the northern states also tend to have been migrants from other parts of Mexico. They travel much more frequently to the U.S. than those from other parts of the country.¹⁷ The center-west has also benefited from globalization as multinational firms have extended their production chains more deeply into Mexico, particularly to regional cities such as León in Guanajuato (Rothstein 2005). Finally, the *center* is the most densely populated zone in Mexico, including the nation's capital, the surrounding state of Mexico, and the

nearby state of Puebla. These regions benefited the most from the capital's centralist control of the development process during import-substituting industrialization (Davis 1994). Heavy manufacturing in the center may be the sector most threatened by economic integration. Moreover, Mexico has been ruled from this region for centuries, and officials most directly associated with the *national* state live in greater Mexico City.

At least in terms of preferences about trade relations with the U.S., which in part may reflect voters' evaluations of the impact of trade on their pocketbooks and on the national economy, those from the north and the center-west rather more enthusiastically support improving trade relations with the U.S. (See Table 7.) Those in the north and center-west were also far more likely to evaluate the performance of the economy positively, in terms of both sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations, better than those from the Mexico City area or the south. Indeed, those from the north and the center-west are considerably more optimistic about the economic future than residents of other regions. In the post-election wave of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study, 47% of northerners and 43% of those from the center-west expected the nation's economy to improve over the next year, while 43% and 39% from those two regions, respectively, saw their household's prospects in brighter terms. In contrast, only 24% of greater Mexico City residents and 26% of southerners were optimistic about Mexico's economic future. The region variable, then, is probably capturing this aspect of contemporary Mexican reality.

Table 7 about here

Third, contemporary regional patterns of party competition are built on past patterns of opposition party development. According to this path dependent argument, outside of Mexico City, in those places where electoral opposition emerged early on, the

PAN established a presence that makes it difficult to dislodge. Since 1988, when the PRD came onto the scene, and especially where opposition has developed as a result of local PRI organizations defecting from the party, the PRD has gained the advantage.¹⁸

Opposition has certainly emerged in different regions at different times. Outside of Mexico City, strong challenges first emerged in several northern states (e.g., Baja California), some center-west states (e.g., San Luis Potosí), and the state of Yucatán. The PAN established party organizations and won control of local governments in those areas first. (See the cases in Rodríguez and Ward 1995.) Electoral opposition made little headway in the center and south until well into the 1990s. When it did, the PRD was already on the scene and prepared to compete for office, sometimes by opportunistically absorbing the PRI's local machines (Bruhn 1997; Wuhs n.d.). Because the PRI did not easily yield to opposition competition, the pattern that emerged tended to be two-party competition -- the PRI versus either the PAN or the PRD -- depending on which opposition bloc first emerged as a viable challenger. Competition thus assumed an "ins-versus-outs" character, rather than an ideological struggle.¹⁹

This conflict also played out within each region. In the smaller states of Baja California Sur, Nayarit, and Zacatecas, the PAN made little headway during the 1980s, but the PRD successfully challenged the PRI in the late 1990s (Klesner 1999). The PRD continues to have a strong presence in those three states, and López Obrador won them all in 2006. In contrast, by the time the opposition was able to compete electorally in the south—only after 1988—the PRD already existed, and it in many cases accepted into its ranks former *priistas* who had failed to win party nominations for important state-level

offices. These defectors often brought along their portion of the PRI party machinery. The PAN has been less effective at breaking into the south.

The foregoing paragraph begs a final question: Why was the earlier existing PAN able to get a foot in the door in the north and center-west in the 1980s and before, but not in the south? To a considerable extent, the answer is due to the first two factors discussed above: different regional political cultures and the differential impact of economic integration. The PAN's ideology was more appealing to religious Mexicans; it also drew strong support in those areas that were sufficiently well-developed to have an independent business sector and a larger middle class.

The bottom line is that those factors operated two decades and more ago. The PAN and the PRI have kept the PRD out of the contest for state and local positions in much of the country and still do so today. This fact undoubtedly allowed Calderón to win the 2006 presidential election. Unless the PRI collapses, allowing the PRD to pick up its pieces in the north and center, the current pattern of regional division will continue. In fact, if economic integration continues to have its differential impact on northern and southern Mexico, these regional bases of partisan competition may even strengthen.

Concluding remarks

In their seminal study on the emergence of partisan cleavages, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) argued that the party systems in place in postwar Europe had their origins in profound conflicts that had taken place much earlier in those nations' histories. The sequence of these conflicts and the way they were resolved determined the partisan preferences of social groups. Parties proved able to reproduce these loyalties

over subsequent generations, long after the conflicts from which those cleavages emerged had subsided.

The PRI's dominance prevented the appearance of such cleavages in post-revolutionary Mexico. Nevertheless, resentment of the PRI smoldered among the descendents of the Cristeros and business groups that grew to find the PRI's statist economic policies objectionable in the 1970s and 1980s. The PAN exploited this opposition, and in so doing helped to create the current partisan divisions.

Are we seeing the emergence in Mexico of true cleavage structures, like those described by Lipset and Rokkan? Probably not. Protracted transition to democracy meant that opposition activists spent a decade and a half focused on ousting the PRI from Los Pinos. Today, electoral pressures to act as catch-all coalitions militate against defining their social bases of support too narrowly (Klesner 2005). The demographic indicators used in this chapter, including region, collectively explain only about 20 percent of the individual-level variation in the vote. (See the pseudo R^2 statistics in Table A2.) Clearly other factors – political values, evaluations of the incumbent president and the economy, candidate qualities, and campaign messages – still shape voters' decisions to a greater extent than do their social and demographic characteristics.

Nevertheless, we may be witnessing the emergence of a partisan cleavage that revolves around the nation's response to globalization, including economic integration into the larger North American economy. Those in the north and the center-west have more successfully met the economic challenges of globalization; the wealthy and the educated have the resources and skills to benefit from it. Finally, younger Mexicans can more effectively adapt to globalization's demands than their elders. Because the PAN is the

party most supportive of Mexico's integration into the global economy on liberal terms, that party has grown disproportionately in the north and center-west, with the Mexican middle and upper-middle classes, and among the younger generations. López Obrador's message, by contrast, clearly resonates better among older Mexicans. The PRI, which has not yet found a clear programmatic position after falling from power, has relied on the votes of the old, the economically vulnerable, and the ignorant – those least able to choose a new partisan preference. If the PRI continues to do so, it will gradually fade from the electoral scene as its social base passes away. Whether the PRD succeeds in López Obrador's strategy of appealing to the PRI base may determine whether these social divisions come to dominate the electoral landscape.

Appendix 1

Multivariate analysis at the county level

This employs three groups of explanatory variables: modernization, religion, and region. It relies on three separate indicators of “modernization”: urbanization, the percent of the workforce in the manufacturing and construction sectors (the secondary sector), and literacy. Experience has shown that these three variables can be used together in a multiple regression analysis because the inter-correlation among them is relatively low (among the several possible variables tapping modernization and the structure of society) so that multicollinearity among the explanatory variables is minimized (Klesner 2005). The percentage of the population in a county that is Catholic varies much more at the county level than at the district or state levels. The regional breakdown that I use here is the same as used in several earlier articles—it separates the Federal District and the state of México from other central states (Tlaxcala, Morelos, Hidalgo, and Puebla) on the grounds that the greater Mexico City area has distinct political characteristics.²⁰ The remainder of the central states form the base case on which the model is created.

Table A1 about here

Appendix 2

Multinomial logit analysis of panel data

The multinomial logit regression models employed only those respondents in the national sample of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study who appeared in all three waves of the survey. Multinomial logit operates by creating a series of contrasts between the reference case—one response on the dependent variable (one candidate, in this case)—and each of the other responses. In this study, I use López Obrador as the reference case. To simplify the interpretation of the results, I eliminated all cases other than those who voted for López Obrador, Calderón, or Madrazo—i.e., those who reported not voting, voting for one of the minor candidates, and those refusing to answer. Table A2 reports the multinomial logit analysis of the individual level data.

Table A2 about here

An analytical advantage of our Mexico 2006 Panel Study dataset comes from the incorporated aggregate data of the localities and counties in which the respondents reside. We can use several variables earlier reported in Table 2 into the model reported in Table A2.²¹ I show the results from estimating that second multinomial logit model in Table A3. Again, to explore the Calderón—López Obrador division in the electorate, I use the López Obrador vote as the reference category.

Table A3 about here

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Table 1: Socioeconomic Characteristics and Presidential Vote, 2006

	<i>Felipe Calderón</i>	<i>Roberto Madrazo</i>	<i>Andrés Manuel López Obrador</i>	<i>Percent of Sample</i>
Sex				
Male	36.4	21.5	37.3	53.2
Female	38.2	22.5	32.3	46.8
Age				
18–29	37.7	21.2	33.5	30.8
30–49	38.3	20.7	35.2	48.7
50+	33.8	26.1	36.5	20.5
Rural/Urban				
Urban	39.6	19.5	34.8	71.4
Rural/Mixed	31.4	28.2	35.5	28.6
Monthly income (10 pesos ≈ US\$1)				
Less than 2,000 pesos	30.5	30.4	34.2	20.1
2,000–4,000 pesos	32.1	23.9	38.6	25.5
4,000–9,200 pesos	37.7	19.0	36.7	36.6
More than 9,200 pesos	49.8	13.9	29.9	17.8
Education level				
None	29.1	32.0	35.5	4.0
Primary	34.8	28.6	32.2	29.4
Secondary	35.9	23.6	34.4	25.9
Preparatory	38.9	16.1	36.6	18.2
University	42.4	14.1	37.8	22.4
Union member in family?				
Yes	33.1	22.2	36.8	11.6
No	37.8	21.9	34.8	87.4
Religion and religiosity				
Catholic	39.0	21.6	33.5	84.2
Protestant	31.4	26.7	37.8	7.6
Non-believer	23.3	17.5	51.4	5.0
Weekly church attender	38.8	24.8	31.2	45.2
Never attend services	31.1	17.0	45.0	10.1
Total	37.2	22.0	35.9	100.0

Source: *Reforma* exit poll (July 2, 2006).

Cells show row percentages. Rows do not sum to 100% because respondents who voted for other candidates and those who refused to answer are not reported.

Table 2: Socioeconomic Context and Electoral Choice

	<i>Means</i>			<i>Difference of Means</i> <i>(t-score, two-tailed, sig. in parentheses)</i>		
	Calderón	Madraza	López Obrador	Calderón vs. López Obrador	Madraza vs. Calderón	López Obrador vs. Madraza
Population Density	1772	1333	3787	5.004 (.000)	1.224 (.222)	4.672 (.000)
<i>Sectoral Share of Workforce</i>						
Primary Sector	0.167	0.260	0.199	2.059 (.040)	3.784 (.000)	2.059 (.040)
Secondary Sector	0.271	0.251	0.227	4.554 (.000)	1.674 (.085)	2.072 (.039)
Services Sector	0.523	0.451	0.534	0.575 (.566)	3.510 (.000)	3.540 (.000)
Catholic %	0.902	0.895	0.905	0.435 (.664)	0.778 (.437)	0.896 (.371)
Indigenous Languages Speakers %	0.009	0.036	0.062	3.587 (.000)	2.639 (.009)	1.040 (.299)
Literacy Rate	0.916	0.899	0.896	2.438 (.015)	2.241 (.025)	0.287 (.774)
Average Years of School Completed	7.46	7.07	7.54	0.483 (.629)	2.106 (.036)	2.207 (.028)
% with Health Insurance	0.451	0.392	0.392	3.736 (.000)	3.021 (.003)	0.003 (.997)
% Households receiving Remittances	4.94	5.67	3.95	2.698 (.007)	1.271 (.205)	3.490 (.001)

Source: Mexico 2006 Panel Study and accompanying aggregate dataset.

Figure 1
Blue and Yellow Mexico



Figure 2
Patterns of Party Competition
in the 2006 Deputy Election




Table 3: Socioeconomic Characteristics of PRI Ballot Splitters, 2006

	<i>PRI Congress and Madrazo</i>	<i>PRI Congress and López Obrador</i>	<i>PRI Congress and Calderón</i>	<i>Percent of Sample</i>
Sex				
Male	52.8	58.7	50.3	53.2
Female	47.2	41.3	49.7	46.8
Age				
18–29	28.0	35.5	41.4	30.8
30–49	46.9	49.2	42.0	48.7
50+	25.2	15.2	16.7	20.5
Rural/Urban				
Rural/Mixed	36.2	26.0	22.5	28.6
Urban	63.8	74.0	77.5	71.4
Monthly income (10 pesos ≈ US\$1)				
Less than 2,000 pesos	28.6	17.9	12.7	20.1
2,000–4,000 pesos	27.3	25.4	23.6	25.5
4,000–9,200 pesos	32.4	40.5	42.0	36.6
More than 9,200 pesos	11.6	16.2	21.7	17.8
Education level				
None	5.6	0.5	1.7	4.0
Primary	39.4	15.3	19.7	29.4
Secondary	27.5	29.6	28.9	25.9
Preparatory	12.3	22.4	22.5	18.2
University	14.6	31.6	27.2	22.4
Union member in family?				
Yes	11.7	15.8	11.6	11.6
No	87.0	84.2	87.9	87.4
Religion and religiosity				
Catholic	82.9	80.6	89.1	84.2
Protestant	9.5	8.7	6.3	7.6
Non-believer	3.8	5.1	2.8	5.0
Weekly church attender	51.6	39.1	48.0	45.2
Never attend services	7.8	14.2	12.7	10.1

Source: *Reforma* exit poll (July 2, 2006). Cells show column percentages within variables.

Table 4: Social Characteristics of Loyalists and Defectors, 2000-2006

	<i>PAN loyalists</i>	<i>Fox defectors to AMLO</i>	<i>PRI loyalists</i>	<i>PRI defect to AMLO</i>	<i>PRI defect to Calderon</i>	<i>Percent of Sample</i>
Sex						
Male	53.8	60.8	55.2	51.1	55.0	53.2
Female	46.2	39.2	44.8	48.9	45.0	46.8
Age						
18–29	19.1	16.5	18.9	18.2	19.2	30.8
30–49	59.5	59.9	50.6	54.5	55.8	48.7
50+	21.4	23.6	30.5	27.3	25.0	20.5
Rural/Urban						
Rural/Mixed	23.4	20.8	37.0	20.9	21.7	28.6
Urban	76.6	79.2	63.0	79.1	78.3	71.4
Monthly income (10 pesos ≈ US\$1)						
Less than 2,000 pesos	13.7	14.5	24.8	22.6	19.4	20.1
2,000–4,000 pesos	21.0	27.6	26.5	27.1	28.7	25.5
4,000–9,200 pesos	36.9	41.3	34.7	34.8	30.6	36.6
More than 9,200 pesos	28.4	16.6	14.0	15.5	21.3	17.8
Education level						
None	2.6	2.3	6.4	6.8	5.0	4.0
Primary	28.3	26.5	39.5	29.5	30.0	29.4
Secondary	23.4	26.9	27.2	25.6	22.5	25.9
Preparatory	17.4	20.4	9.6	11.4	15.8	18.2
University	28.1	23.9	16.6	26.1	26.7	22.4
Union member in family?						
Yes	11.5	12.1	13.2	15.8	11.7	11.6
No	87.7	87.2	85.7	82.5	86.7	87.4
Religion and religiosity						
Catholic	89.9	82.1	84.0	80.8	90.1	84.2
Protestant	6.0	9.2	9.6	11.3	4.1	7.6
Non-believer	2.2	5.3	3.0	4.5	3.3	5.0
Weekly church attender	49.3	43.7	54.9	46.9	50.8	45.2
Never attend services	7.1	10.8	7.1	10.7	5.8	10.1
Total	20.5	10.6	10.2	3.0	2.1	100.0

Source: *Reforma* exit poll (July 2, 2006). Cells show column percentages within variables.

Figure 3:
Predicted Votes Shares and Catholicism
Based on County-Level Aggregate Data Analysis





Figure 4:
Predicted Vote Shares and Literacy
Based on County-Level Aggregate Data Analysis



**Table 5: Predicted Votes Shares of Major Candidates
Controlling for Other Explanatory Variables**
Based on County-Level Aggregate Data Analysis

	<i>Calderón</i>	<i>López Obrador</i>	<i>Madrazo</i>
North	42.3	24.4	26.5
South	31.9	38.2	24.4
Metro	23.2	53.2	16.3
Center-West	43.6	25.7	23.4
Center	33.3	39.3	20.0

**Table 6: Predicted Vote Shares in 2006 Presidential Election
Based on Multinomial Logit Analysis**

	Calderón	Madrazo	López Obrador
All Variables Set to Mean	44.5	19.4	36.2
Male	37.7	21.0	41.2
Female	50.6	17.8	31.7
Under 30	45.6	21.6	32.8
30-49	46.4	16.0	37.6
50 and older	39.7	23.8	36.5
Rural	30.9	33.6	35.4
Urban	48.7	16.0	35.3
White	49.5	18.5	32.0
Brown	39.6	18.9	41.6
Dark Brown	50.2	20.2	29.7
Catholic	45.5	19.2	35.4
Non-Catholic	39.2	20.5	40.2
Weekly Church Attendance	45.6	21.9	32.5
Less Frequent Church Attendance	43.0	17.2	39.8
Union Family	38.1	23.8	38.1
Non-Union Family	45.3	18.8	35.8
North	51.8	27.4	20.8
Center-West	55.1	15.9	29.0
South	34.5	24.7	40.8
Mexico City Metro Center	28.6	8.7	62.6
Center	51.5	20.8	27.6

Figure 5
Income and Vote Choice:
Predicted Values Based on Multinomial Logit Analysis




Figure 6:
Education and Vote Share:
Predicted Vote based on Multinomial Logit Analysis




Table 7: Regional Preferences Regarding Trade Relations with the United States

<i>Would you prefer that trade between Mexico and the United States increase, decrease, or remain about the same?</i>	<i>North</i>	<i>Center-West</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Metro</i>	<i>Center</i>	Total
Increase	59.5	54.6	38.4	41.5	48.8	48.6
Stay the same	24.8	25.0	33.9	34.0	27.6	29.1
Decrease	9.5	13.0	15.4	21.3	18.2	15.0
DK/NA	6.2	7.4	12.3	3.2	5.4	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Mexico 2006 Panel Study, Second Wave.

Table A1: Multiple regression analysis of direction of the presidential vote, municipio-level data

<i>Explanatory Variables</i>	<i>Calderón</i>				<i>López Obrador</i>				<i>Madrazo</i>			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	Sig.	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	Sig.	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			B	Std. Error			B	Std. Error		
(Constant)	-0.188	0.036		0.000	0.417	0.038		0.000	0.672	0.021		0.000
Urbanization > 20,000	0.096	0.008	0.263	0.000	-0.025	0.008	-0.064	0.003	-0.080	0.005	-0.332	0.000
Secondary Sector Employment 2000	0.183	0.023	0.134	0.000	-0.264	0.025	-0.180	0.000	0.063	0.014	0.069	0.000
percent Catholic in 2000	0.367	0.030	0.208	0.000	-0.119	0.032	-0.063	0.000	-0.262	0.018	-0.225	0.000
literacy rate 2000	0.143	0.037	0.087	0.000	0.170	0.039	0.097	0.000	-0.262	0.022	-0.242	0.000
North region	0.090	0.007	0.273	0.000	-0.149	0.007	-0.419	0.000	0.065	0.004	0.295	0.000
South region	-0.014	0.007	-0.041	0.054	-0.011	0.008	-0.030	0.159	0.044	0.004	0.188	0.000
Edomex and DF	-0.101	0.008	-0.257	0.000	0.148	0.008	0.352	0.000	-0.037	0.005	-0.142	0.000
Center-West region	0.103	0.007	0.281	0.000	-0.127	0.007	-0.323	0.000	0.034	0.004	0.141	0.000
N=2,426	R Square	Adjusted R Square	F	Sig.	R Square	Adjusted R Square	F	Sig.	R Square	Adjusted R Square	F	Sig.
	0.533	0.531	344.38	.000	0.544	0.543	360.62	.000	0.623	0.622	499.34	.000

OLS estimates. Cases weighted by size using lista nominal (2000).

Table A2: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Vote Choice

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Felipe Calderón</i>			<i>Roberto Madrazo</i>		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Intercept	-0.91	0.059		-1.10	0.058	
Under 30	0.10	0.692	1.10	0.36	0.232	1.44
Over 50	-0.02	0.922	0.98	0.67	0.018	1.96
White	0.37	0.149	1.45	0.09	0.774	1.10
Dark Brown	0.41	0.065	1.50	0.31	0.226	1.37
Female	0.65	0.002	1.92	0.33	0.190	1.38
Catholic	0.11	0.683	1.12	-0.07	0.834	0.94
Weekly Church Attendance	0.13	0.520	1.14	0.12	0.614	1.13
Income	0.13	0.004	1.14	0.00	0.982	1.00
Education	-0.04	0.473	0.96	-0.03	0.642	0.97
Rural	-0.36	0.117	0.70	0.10	0.708	1.10
Union household	-0.22	0.497	0.80	0.27	0.448	1.31
North	1.32	0.000	3.74	1.05	0.005	2.86
Center-West	0.53	0.081	1.69	-0.03	0.941	0.97
South	-0.07	0.795	0.93	0.19	0.562	1.21
Mexico City metro	-1.06	0.001	0.34	-1.51	0.001	0.22
Pseudo R-square	Cox and Snell = 0.18			Naglekerke = 0.20		

Reference category is López Obrador. The sample includes only those respondents who were surveyed in all three waves of the panel study and who were also in the national sample (N=637 because of missing data). Coefficients in bold are significant at the .10 level.

Table A3: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Vote Choice, Incorporating Contextual Variables

<i>Explanatory Variable</i>	<i>Felipe Calderón</i>			<i>Roberto Madrazo</i>		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Intercept	4.86	0.135		-1.39	0.569	
Under 30	0.11	0.701	1.11	0.44	0.220	1.55
Over 50	-0.13	0.639	0.88	0.42	0.204	1.52
White	0.48	0.108	1.62	0.23	0.546	1.26
Dark Brown	0.59	0.024	1.80	0.42	0.180	1.52
Female	0.57	0.017	1.76	0.10	0.740	1.10
Catholic	0.29	0.330	1.34	0.08	0.825	1.09
Weekly Church Attendance	0.26	0.270	1.29	0.44	0.116	1.56
% Catholic in locality	-2.94	0.308	0.05	0.62	0.732	1.86
Income	0.14	0.004	1.16	0.01	0.889	1.01
% of Households with health insurance in locality	4.09	0.001	59.64	3.35	0.009	28.39
Education	-0.01	0.834	0.99	-0.09	0.206	0.91
Average years of education in locality	-0.50	0.000	0.60	-0.14	0.355	0.87
% speaking indigenous languages in locality	-7.75	0.020	0.00	-2.38	0.074	0.09
Rural	-0.45	0.228	0.64	0.74	0.067	2.10
% of workforce in secondary sector	-2.14	0.150	0.12	-1.09	0.534	0.34
Union household	-0.24	0.498	0.79	0.17	0.676	1.18
% of households receiving remittances in locality	-0.06	0.302	0.94	-0.03	0.709	0.97
North	0.28	0.580	1.32	0.56	0.277	1.75
Center-West	0.03	0.950	1.03	-0.33	0.587	0.72
South	-0.82	0.065	0.44	-0.23	0.627	0.79
Mexico City	-1.45	0.000	0.23	-1.78	0.001	0.17
Pseudo R-square	Cox and Snell = 0.24			Naglekerke = 0.28		

Reference category is López Obrador. The sample includes only those respondents who were surveyed in all three waves of the panel study and who were also in the national sample (N=545 because of missing data). Coefficients in bold are significant at the .10 level.

¹ I thank Alejandro Moreno for making the exit poll data available for this analysis.

² In the national sample of Wave 3 of the Mexico 2006 Panel Study, in contrast, a significant difference emerges between Calderón and Madrazo among union and non-union families, with Calderón gaining about a 12% higher share of non-union than union votes while Madrazo had a 12% higher vote share coming from union than non-union votes.

³ Overt partisan appeals by religious figures are illegal in Mexico.

⁴ Skin color is a marker of class status in Mexico, with whiter-skinned persons typically enjoying higher education, living standards, and social status. An interviewer's coding of skin color cannot, of course, establish a respondent's self-perception of where she fits into racial categories. In general though, those of darker-brown skin are more likely to be of indigenous parentage.

⁵ Since many PRI voters obviously split their ballots, my analysis here does not take into account the full PRI voter base, especially those voting more strategically in the presidential race.

⁶ For some representative examples, see Aziz Nassif 2006; CIDAC 2006; Lopez-Bassols 2006. For contrary views, Díaz-Cayeros 2006; Merino, Morales, and Ponce 2006.

⁷ The PAN's colors are blue and white, the PRD's yellow (the Mexican sun) with black.

⁸ Díaz-Cayeros 2006 offers a county-level analysis that shows pockets of PRI support spread across the nation.

⁹ For a much more detailed study of ballot splitting and cross-over voting and their meaning for electoral alignment, see Moreno and Méndez 2007.

¹⁰ To simplify the analysis I have defined a straight-ticket voter as someone who votes for the same party's candidates in both presidential and deputy elections, ignoring for the moment the senatorial races. A split-ticket voter, hence, casts ballots for different parties in these two races. My method here *underestimates* split-ticket voting by not including senatorial contests.

¹¹ Clarify uses STATA regression results as input into a Monte Carlo simulation program designed to produce more readily interpretable output. In this case I sought simple predicted vote shares based on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of voters.

¹² The income measure I use is an average of the self-reported income in the May and July waves of the panel study. Hence it is a continuous variable. Similar results emerge if we use an index of major household possessions.

¹³ The education measure I use is an average of the self-reported education level achieved by the respondent as reported in all three waves of the panel study.

¹⁴ Of the 927 respondents who were in all three waves of the national sample, 53.8% expressed the same preference in October as they reported that they actually voted in July. The results of the multinomial logit regression applied to the October wave of the study can be found at [NAME A WEBSITE](#).

¹⁵ For an analysis of the north and some of its self-perceptions in the period of the Revolution, see Carr 1973. The classic study of Mexican regionalism is Simpson 1941 (and many subsequent editions).

¹⁶ See the studies in Randall 1996.

¹⁷ The northerners surveyed in the *México y el Mundo* study (2004) had traveled abroad on average ten times in their lives, in contrast to a national figure of about three times.

See Klesner 2006.

¹⁸ For arguments that explore the diffusion of PAN and PRD governance at the municipal level in concentrated regions of Mexico, see Lujambio 2001; Hiskey and Bowler 2005; Hiskey and Canache 2005.

¹⁹ I develop this argument more fully in Klesner 2005.

²⁰ The regional distribution of the states used in this paper is as follows: *North*: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas; *Center-West*: Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, Querétaro; *Center*: Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala; *Mexico City area*: Federal District, Estado de México; *South*: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán.

²¹ I exclude as explanatory variables the following variables reported in Table 2 in order to avoid multicollinearity in the model: population density (collinear with our rural/urban dummy variable) and % literate in the locality (collinear with average number of years of education in the locality). Multicollinearity would occur if all three sectoral employment variables were included. Because I included secondary sector in the aggregate data model, I included it again in the model reported in Table A3.