Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America

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With the return of democracy to those nations in South America that had suffered under military rule in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and with the opening of the Mexican one-party regime to greater competition in the 1990s, some of the most significant barriers to citizen participation in politics in those nations came down. To greater and lesser degrees, democracies permit or even encourage citizen participation in political life, while most authoritarian regimes discourage it, particularly the military regimes that were explicitly anti-political in the Southern Cone. With the return of democracy to Latin America, then, we might expect greater political participation in the region. Indeed, democracy generally relies upon citizen participation to promote healthy and representative input of public opinion about policy issues to decision-making authorities, and much of the collective effort that we might label political at the local level depends on voluntary contributions of time and resources by ordinary citizens. If democracy in Latin America is to go beyond its procedural minimums, citizen involvement in politics is a must.

The scholarly study of political participation has been reinvigorated by the recent attention by scholars, activists, and development professionals to the concept of social capital. Much of that attention has focused on developing countries, as social scientists and development workers have sought to determine whether communities with higher levels of social capital gain development benefits from their citizens' involvement in

social groups.[1] Robert Putnam's influential *Bowling Alone* (2000), focused on the United States, has turned our attention toward the role of social capital in facilitating richness in the democratic experience, especially in the form of individuals' involvement in political life. In that widely read and provocative work, Putnam laments the decline of social capital in the U.S. and its implications for American democracy. His work has provoked several studies exploring the extent of social capital in the U.S. and other established democracies and exploring its relationship to political participation (e.g., the studies in Skocpol and Fiorina and in Putnam 2002; Teorell 2003; Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2003).

In many other contexts around the world, our concern may be less the decline of social capital than its simple dearth. In the former Soviet bloc, a long history of repression and surveillance discouraged people from broadly associating with others, which has led to political habits of apathy among citizens of those countries. Similarly, in Latin American, explicitly anti-political military regimes endeavored to stamp out participative cultures in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and other nations. In other cases, of which Mexico is the best example, more inclusionary regimes have nevertheless sought to channel political activity within very limited bounds. Of course, if higher levels of social capital do not promote greater political participation and a richer, more healthy democratic experience, then our worries about the meaning of low levels of social capital or declining stocks of social capital would be simply misplaced. If social capital does encourage political activity, however, then determining ways to engage citizens in all forms of social groups may be a particularly effective means to promote a higher quality

[1] See the substantial library of works on social capital and development at the World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/socialcapital.

of democratic life around the globe. Does social capital promote political participation? Do communities and nations with greater stocks of social capital also have higher levels of political activity by their citizens? Are citizens who participate in a variety of non-political civic groups thereby encouraged to engage in political activity?

This paper explores the role of social capital and other causal factors in promoting political participation in Latin America. I attempt to assess the rates of political participation as well as stocks of social capital in Latin America when set in global perspective. I endeavor to determine the importance of social capital for promoting political involvement, in particular for gauging its relative weight as an explanatory factor. To do so, I analyze individual-level data drawn from the 1999-2001 wave of the World Values Survey.

Social Capital and Political Participation

In recent years scholars have placed significant attention on the role of social capital in promoting the effectiveness of democratic systems (e.g., Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Social capital, understood to mean "features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam 1995: 664-5), may be closely related to political participation, although the two concepts are not synonymous. Indeed, Putnam argues that we must distinguish between political participation—"or relations with political institutions"—and social capital—"our relations with one another." (Putnam 1995: 665) Whether social capital influences the propensity to participate politically is an empirical question, although Putnam (1995, 2000) has marshaled considerable

evidence to argue that declining rates of political participation in the United States are associated with the erosion of social capital. In a similar vein, Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman (1995) have demonstrated that for acts of political participation requiring time, respondents who have acquired civic skills from their organizational or church memberships or from their jobs are more likely participate (see also Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 and the early study by Nie, Powell, and Prewitt 1969).

More recent studies have provided support for Putnam's thesis linking social capital with political participation, while refining our understanding of the linkage. For example, in her study of political activism in Central America, Amber Seligson (1999) explored the role of organizational involvement in encouraging political participation. She found that involvement only in community development organizations consistently predicted demand making in the six nations of Central America. In another study using the same data, John Booth and Patricia Richard explored the role of civil society activism in forming both social capital and political capital, by which they mean "attitudes and behaviors that actually influence regimes in some way." (1998: 782) Among their concerns, thus, was to understand how civil society activism forms attitudes that support democracy. Anirudh Krishna (2002), in a study of Indian villages, pointed out that social capital may promote political participation, but not necessarily democratic participation. Krishna's principal finding highlighted the role of new leaders in villages—he showed that capable new leaders were necessary to direct and channel the participation of high social capital villages. Pippa Norris (2002) contributes an extensive discussion of social capital in her recent book on political participation and draws our attention to the

importance of separately operationalizing the social trust and associational activism dimensions of social capital. She does not, however, explore the link between associational activism or social trust and political participation. In short, given the importance of the Putnam thesis for our understanding of political participation and given the relatively small attention paid to it by scholars, especially in the larger nations of Latin America, further exploration of the Putnam thesis in Latin America seems timely and important.

Political Participation in Latin America

John Booth and Mitchell Seligson argued a generation ago that "much of the [then] conventional wisdom regarding political participation in Latin America lacks empirical validity." (1978a: 26) Surveying the literature on participation in Latin America, Booth and Seligson identified several "images" of participation:

1. Violence: "Probably the most widespread image is that violence . . . characterizes political activity in Latin America." (1978a: 9)
2. Irrationality: many authors have suggested that Latin Americans fail to engage in goal-oriented political activity because of sociocultural traits that inhibit the full application of reason in politics.
3. Political mobilization: authors in the 1960s and 1970s explained increasing political participation on either socioeconomic modernization or on the roles of states and other political actors in promoting political participation.
4. Limited mass participation: a "picture emerges of a substantial majority of citizens who remain virtually inactive (much less active than their First World

counterparts) as far as political affairs go, lacking the time, energy, skills, and interest necessary for participation." (1978a: 19)

5. Participation monopolized by upper strata: the wealthy dominate political activity while the Latin American masses have remained largely passive in their involvement with pubic affairs.

Booth and Seligson argued and the studies they compiled in the last comprehensive analysis of political participation in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 1978b; Seligson and Booth 1979) showed that none of these images accurately reflected Latin American reality in the 1970s. Indeed, the third, fourth, and fifth images are in conflict in significant ways. Nor have they reflected Latin American experience since then. Authors of a variety of studies of popular organizations and social movements have shown how ordinary, non-elite Latin Americans have created organizations and engaged in demand-making activities in ways that can only be interpreted as rational (see also Craig and Foweraker 1990; Chalmers 1997; Escobar and Alvarez 1992).

The preponderance of studies of Latin American political participation in recent years have tended to focus either on electoral turnout, in which case the authors draw on ample volumes of aggregate data and conduct statistically-rigorous studies either within Latin American nations (e.g., Klesner and Lawson 2001) or across them (Pérez-Liñán 2001), or on social movements and popular organizations, n which case the authors typically conduct careful case studies of (typically) successful efforts at mobilizing by neighborhood associations, human rights organizations, or other popular organizations (e.g., Craig and Foweraker 1990; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Oxhorn 1995; Chalmers 1997). The latter group of studies tells us that the poor and the oppressed can create

efficacious modes of political participation even in the face of resistance from authoritarian rulers and dominant economic elites. They do not as successfully provide a sense of how widely effective such mobilizing efforts have been—how many Latin Americans are involved in community-based organizations, or how many are members of human rights groups or environmental organizations, for example.

Most studies of Latin American political participation have not drawn on individual-level data either (however, for recent examples, see A. Seligson 1999 and Booth and Richard 1998). Survey evidence can tell us which kinds of individuals are more likely to participate politically. The social capital argument is in some ways a two-level argument, as the recent study by Krishna (2002) makes clear. That is, there are collective characteristics of communities that cause them to be richer in social capital, which in turn facilitates the participation of individuals. Studying those collective characteristics of communities across nations, however, would prove to be a much larger research task than can be undertaken in this study. Rather, I will focus on the participation of individuals across four Latin American nations, and to get the basic data on political participation of individuals, we must rely survey evidence.

Data

This paper draws on the 1999-2001 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS).[2] The World Values Survey was administered in eighty-two countries in all world regions in 1999-2001. Among the Latin American nations polled in that wave of the WVS, this paper focuses on Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.[3]

[2]Ronald Inglehart, et al., *World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys*, 1999-2001 (Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2004).

[3] The 1999-2001 WVS was also given in Venezuela, but not all questions relevant to this study were included, so it is excluded from the full analysis. The 1999-2001 World Values data set also incorporates survey results from Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Uruguay taken from the

Although the World Values Survey is primarily intended to permit cross-national comparison of norms and values and to chart changing attitudes about a multitude of social, political, and cultural matters, the most recent wave has incorporated additional questions designed to facilitate the study of political participation and social organization. Furthermore, of the surveys publicly available, only the WVS provides the cross-national breadth that allows comparative analysis of political participation and organizational involvement in Latin America.

Because it was not principally designed for the study of political participation, and because it is administered in countries in which elections are not held, the WVS does not ask about the voting behavior of respondents. Hence, regrettably, the WVS also does not ask about campaigning and various activities surrounding the political campaigns. Thus I will not explore electoral participation and campaigning in this study. The WVS does ask a standard battery of questions about political activity, namely, whether the respondent had ever or would ever sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a demonstration, join an illegal strike, or occupy a building.[4] This set of questions is intended to measure sequentially more risky or costly modes of participation (especially in that joining an illegal strike or occupying a building are apt to bring strenuous resistance from the authorities). In addition, the most recent WVS questionnaire asked respondents whether they belonged to and contributed voluntary work for a series of social organizations, of which the following may be considered explicitly political: political parties, local political action, human rights or third world development organizations, environmental

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previous (1995-97) wave of the survey. Several questions used in the present study were not asked in the earlier waves of the WVS, and hence those countries are not included in the full multivariate analysis. Some bivariate relationships are reported for those countries, where data exist.

[4] See the appendix for the exact wording of this and other questions used in the analysis presented here.

groups, women's groups, and the peace movement. These modes of political participation form the behavioral basis of political activity as measured for the analysis in this paper. Absent a cross-national survey of political participation in Latin America, these data are the best we have available to explore the questions posed at the outset of this paper. Therefore, when I refer to political participation in the remainder of this paper, I mean this particular set of demand-making and voluntary activities and, regrettably, I do not mean electoral participation or campaigning.

Latin American Political Participation in Comparative Perspective

To gain a better sense of the level of political activity of Latin Americans and to place that participation in comparative and global context, I created an index of political activity. For each individual respondent, I determined whether she or he had ever taken part in each of the political acts mentioned above: signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending a demonstration, joining an unofficial strike, occupying a building, or belonging to a political party. I gave each respondent one point for having engaged in each of those acts. In addition, I gave each respondent one point each for having provided voluntary work for the following organizations: political parties, local political action groups, human rights or third world development organizations, environmental groups, women's organizations, and the peace movement. Thus, a respondent's political activity index could range from 0 to 11. I then computed the mean of those individual scores for each nation. Table 1 provides a comparative summary of participation in several of the nations surveyed in the 1999-2001 WVS, grouped mainly by region.

Table 1 about here

As Table 1 indicates, Latin American countries lag behind the wealthy, established democracies in terms of their volume of political activity. The average Scandinavian, Briton, or German engages in significantly more types of political activity than the average Mexican or South American. At the same time, Latin Americans participate in more political activities than do residents of most but not all of the republics that have emerged out of the Soviet Union and citizens of the eastern European nations once dominated by the Soviet Union. The political participation of residents of three of the four African nations surveyed in the 1999-2001 WVS wave is greater in volume than that of Latin Americans, while in Zimbabwe it is lower. Viet Nam, India, and Bangladesh experience higher rates of political activity than all Latin American countries reported here, while Filipino rates of participation are comparable to Latin American. So the rates of political participation of Latin Americans are not the lowest by global standards, but nor do they rival the rates of the wealthy democracies or even match those of Asian and African developing countries. Moreover, we would hardly expect high volumes of participation in the nations of the former Soviet empire given that those peoples had little opportunity for voluntary participation for decades and that most manifestations of spontaneous or otherwise uncontrolled political initiative were squashed by the communist authorities. Latin American nations, of course, also experienced non-democratic rule for substantial periods in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, which may account for their relatively low rates of political activity too.

Table 2 reports the percentage of each nation's respondents who stated that they had engaged in each of the political activities that make up our participation index. For comparative purposes, I have included data from the U.S. and Canada, as well as Japan

and Spain. Here we see, for example, that about one-third as many Chileans had signed petitions as had Brazilians. The propensities to attend demonstrations or join illegal strikes vary considerably across the region and are not out of line with those of the non-Latin American nations listed in the table. Compared to the U.S. and Canada, though, Latin Americans (and also Japanese and Spanish citizens) engaged in much less voluntary activity for politically oriented organizations.

Table 2 about here

The foregoing descriptive statistics suggest that Latin American non-electoral political participation is hardly out of line with that of other countries that have not had long experience with stable democracy or with other developing countries. However, it does bear repeating that Latin Americans have not participated in politics at the same level as have citizens of established democracies. Is this due simply to differences in the level of socioeconomic development between the established democracies and Latin American countries? Is it a matter of political attitudes? Or, do differences in the regions' stocks of social capital account for these differences? And, within Latin America, how can we account for differential rates of participation? In short, what factors propel greater and lesser participation of individuals in Latin America?

Political Participation: Causal Factors

The literature on participation has focused on four major groups of factors that shape political participation: resources, political values, social capital, and institutional opportunities and constraints and other contextual factors. Using data from the WVS, I will explore the first three of these groups of factors sequentially, and then I will examine the interaction of these factors in a multivariate analysis of political participation. A

survey focusing on political attitudes provides very little in the way of direct evidence about institutional opportunities and constraints or other contextual factors that might shape patterns of political participation. Yet in a cross-national study we must recognize that there exist constraints on participation that operate differentially across national settings. Studies of political participation have placed heavy emphasis on the role of institutional constraints and opportunities in shaping the modes of participation pursued and the volume of that participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978; Asher, Richardson, and Weisberg, 1984). Without relying on the direct testimony of either frustrated or empowered participants (which we cannot in these data), we can nevertheless consider some of the key contextual matters operating in Latin America that may structure political involvement. The best way to incorporate that analysis will be to examine the results of the multivariate analysis at the national level.

Socioeconomic Status and Demographic Factors

Many past studies of political participation found the causal bases of political activity in class and other socioeconomic and demographic variables.[5] For instance, older citizens regularly have been identified as more likely to engage in political activities than the young because those who are older have more experience and, typically, a greater stake in society that they need to defend. Those with greater socioeconomic resources, as evidenced by higher income levels, can apply those resources to their political activity (for instance, they can make greater contributions to political campaigns) and, of course, they have a greater property stake at risk in the political sphere that they may wish to protect by participating in the politics. More

[5] For an argument about the need to transcend socioeconomically-based arguments about political participation, see Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1995.

educated citizens are usually found to participate more in politics than their less educated fellow citizens. As Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman Nie (1993: 466-7) summarize the results of numerous studies regarding education and participation:

> Education enhances participation more or less directly by developing skills that are relevant to politics—the ability to speak and write, knowledge of how to cope in an organizational setting—by imparting information about government and politics, and by encouraging attitudes such as a sense of civic responsibility or political efficacy that predispose an individual to political involvement. In addition, education affects activity indirectly: those who have high levels of education are much more likely to command jobs that are lucrative and to develop politically relevant skills at work, in church and in voluntary organizations.

In addition to age, income, and education, students of political participation also typically examine the role of urban and rural residency in promoting political activity. Those studies have reached mixed conclusions: while modernization theorists had argued that urbanization would likely make political participation easier, hence encouraging higher participation rates in cities, others have noted that in large cities the lack of connectedness among citizens discourages them from engaging in collective endeavors, including participating in politics (Asher, Richardson, and Weisberg 1984: 42-3). Finally, in many contexts, one’s gender may influence the likelihood that one will participate politically, especially in more male-dominated societies.

Table 3 offers simple bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients that show the relationship between the socioeconomic and demographic variables mentioned above and several measures of participation and organizational involvement in Latin America. The unconventional activism index sums the responses to the question that asks whether the respondent has ever signed a petition, joined a boycott, attended a demonstration, joined an illegal strike, or occupied a building (thus ranging from 0 to 5, one point tallied for

each activity in which a respondent was engaged). The political activism index is the same as described above and reported in Table 1. The political voluntarism index sums the responses to the question that asks whether a respondent has ever contributed unpaid work to the following types of organizations: political parties, local political action groups, human rights or third world development organizations, environmental groups, women's organizations, and the peace movement (hence it can range from 0 to 6). The political organization index sums responses to the question that asks whether the respondent had simply belonged to the just mentioned political organizations.

Table 3 about here

As Table 3 shows, education is strongly correlated with political participation at the bivariate level in Latin America, as is income and subjective social class.[6] The urbanization measure has mixed findings—while unconventional political activism is associated with urban residence, political voluntarism is more concentrated among rural residents. The correlation between age and unconventional activism, political voluntarism, and belonging to political organizations is positive, as expected, but the relationship is relatively weak. Men are slightly more inclined to political participation than women. These findings reflect the conventional expectations based on comparative research (Asher, Richardson, and Weisberg 1984), which suggests that Latin American political participants share the social and demographic characteristics of those who are active in other societies.

Political Attitudes and Participation

How do political attitudes shape political participation? Broadly, three different dimensions of political attitudes can conceivably shape political behavior: those related to

[6] Subjective social class is inversely ranked (1=upper, 5=lower), hence the negative coefficient in the table.

fundamental political values (one's ideological orientation, or one's preference for order versus change, for example), to political efficacy, and to political engagement. The World Values Survey does not offer a question that adequately taps political efficacy. Let us explore sequentially each of the other dimensions and their implications for political participation.

Fundamental Political Values. By fundamental values, I mean the individual's orientation in favor of change or the status quo and in favor of guaranteeing material gains versus promoting postmaterial values, among others. The WVS offers a wealth of questions designed to measure the fundamental values of individuals. Here we can only touch on a few that are representative of basic political values.

First, we might expect that individuals who advocate political and social change would be more participative than those who prefer to maintain the status quo. Although defending the status quo may in some cases require political action to defend the existing order, those who seek profound change of the society would seem more likely to take action to accomplish their goals. The first panel of Table 4 reports a cross-tabulation of a question asking about one's orientation to change with the index of political activity. Those who had no answer or did not know how they would answer the question are not reported in Table 4; the columns sum to 100 percent within each panel. Much as we would expect, those inclined to radical change participate in more different modes of political action than those who would prefer the status quo. Those not participating in any of forms of political action are more than twice as likely to be defenders of the status quo as radicals seeking revolutionary change. Of those who are highly active, the proportions are roughly reversed.

Table 4 about here

Another way of gauging the preference for change versus the established order is the standard left-right ideological continuum. The WVS uses a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 representing the extreme left and 10 the extreme right, to measure self-placement in the ideological spectrum. In Table 4 I have reduced that scale to three positions: Left (those scoring 0 to 3 on the 11 point scale), Center (4 to 6), and Right (7 to 10). In Latin America, those on the left are more likely to be participants than those on the right. Those with the highest numbers of modes of participation are more likely to be leftists than in the center or the right, although those with no measurable participation are about as likely to be on the left as the total sample.

Ronald Inglehart and other investigators involved with the World Values Survey have operationalized a materialism/postmaterialism index to capture changes in the orientation to politics that they associate with the movement from a society focused primarily on the attainment of material well-being to a postmaterialist world in which values such as the ability of all to participate in society, the defense of the natural environment, and the pursuit of individual spiritual goals take precedence over material concerns (Inglehart 1997, among others).[7] The third panel of Table 4 reports the cross-tabulation of the materialist/postmaterialist index with our participation index. Clearly, those with high levels of political activity tend to fall into the postmaterialist camp, while the non-participators are almost twice as likely to be materialists as postmaterialists.

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[7] The four-point materialism/postmaterialism index is composed out of the following question: "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important? Maintaining order in the nation; giving people more say in important government decisions; fighting rising prices; protecting freedom of speech." Order and prices are considered materialist concerns while the other two responses are postmaterialist. Those respondents choosing postmaterialist concerns as both first and second in importance are coded as holding postmaterialist values. Similarly, two materialist responses put an interviewee into the materialist values camp. One of each means the respondent has mixed values.

Postmaterialists are not, of course, abundant in Latin America (18 percent of the respondents in the four countries examined here), but they tend to participate beyond their numbers.

Political Engagement. By political engagement, I mean the psychological dimension of involvement in politics. While some scholars have suggested that following politics in the media and discussing politics with acquaintances constitutes one mode of political participation,[8] here I am distinguishing between a *subjective engagement* in political affairs which remains on the sidelines and an *active participation* in politics that requires going into the public sphere in one way or another. Major elements of political engagement include the level of one's interest in politics, the importance one attributes to politics, and the extent to which one discusses politics with others. Major studies of political participation have found that political involvement plays a role as an intervening variable between socioeconomic status and political participation (e.g., Nie, Powell, and Prewitt 1969).

The fourth panel of Table 4 displays the relationship between one indicator of political engagement, the level of interest in politics, and our political participation index. A casual glance will suffice to demonstrate the strong relationship between political interest and the volume of political participation. Indeed, the association between these two variables is very strong and linear: those whom are much more interested participate more frequently in politics.

Hence, the expected relationships between political attitudes and political participation seem to hold in Latin America, at least at the bivariate level. However, each of the attitudes that encourage political activism (an orientation in favor change, a strong interest in politics) is held only by small minorities of the samples (see the last column of

[8] See the discussion in Asher, Richardson, and Weisberg, 1984: 48-49.

Table 4). Unless more Latin Americans develop these attitudes, we would not expect high levels of political participation

Social Capital

To operationalize the concept of social capital, from the WVS we can use one attitudinal variable—social trust—and three different sets of behavioral variables, namely, membership in non-political organizations; volunteer work for non-political organizations; and spending time with close friends, co-workers, fellow church members, and with those with whom one plays sports or other recreational activities (which I will label networking). Putnam characterizes membership in organizations as a major element civic engagement. He also argues that one of the major forms of social capital are the relationships that people develop when spending time with others in activities not specifically focused on accomplished collective objectives—playing cards in bridge clubs, for instance (2000: 93-115) Finally, he suggests that social trust is essential for effective civic engagement. Several other scholars have explored the role of social trust in promoting political participation (e.g., Power and Clark 2001; Benson and Rochon 2004), without a clear consensus being reached yet. The basic assumption from which scholars begin to explore this relationship is James Coleman's: "a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and trust." (quoted in Benson and Rochon 2004: 437-8)

First, how do Latin Americans nations compare to other countries surveyed in the WVS in terms of social trust, organizational involvement, voluntary work for non-political organizations, and social networking? Table 5 lists three measures of social

capital by country for most of the nations surveyed in the 1999-2001 wave of the WVS: (1) social trust, as measured by responses to the question, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" (2) an index of non-political voluntary work; and (3) an index of social networking. The non-political voluntarism index sums respondent's replies to the question of whether they had contributed unpaid work to following types of organizations: social welfare service agencies, religious (church, mosque, and so forth) organizations, cultural activities (which include education, hence parent-school associations), labor unions, professional associations, youth organizations, and organizations associated with health care (volunteers at hospitals or neighborhood clinics, for example). The index can thus range from 0 to 7. Because volunteer work for organizations tends to parallel membership in the same organizations, I do not report an index of organizational membership here. The networking index sums responses to the frequency with which those surveyed spent time with friends, spent time socially with colleagues from work, spent time with people from one's church or other religious organization, or spend time socially with people at sports clubs or voluntary or service organizations. It can range from 0 to 12.[9]

Latin American countries rank low in social trust. Their scores are comparable to the former communist societies, although they are not as low as the African countries included in this survey. However, with the exception of Argentines, Latin Americans fare quite well compared to citizens of other countries in terms of volunteer work in non-political organizations. Even the wealthy democracies do not prove to be substantially

[9] For each of these ways of networking, I coded the respondent 1 if he or she did so only a few times a year; 2 if once or twice a month; and 3 if weekly or nearly weekly.

higher than Chile, Mexico, and Peru in the volume of voluntarism undertaken by their citizens, and those three nations undertake unpaid work in non-political social organizations at a considerably higher rate than the residents of formerly communist countries. Latin Americans also compare well to other societies in the volume of social networking in which their citizens engage.

Table 5 about here

To explore the impact of the attitudinal dimension of social capital, i.e., interpersonal trust, on political participation, consider the bottom panel of Table 4, which provides evidence of a positive relationship between interpersonal trust and participation in Latin America. The relationship is not especially strong, however. Moreover, Latin Americans have low levels of interpersonal trust, as Table 5 demonstrates. So even though a relationship between trust and participation exists at bivariate level, the low levels of trust would generally depress political participation in the region.

Turning to the behavioral dimension of social capital, if the measures I have developed to capture the organizational, voluntarism, and social networking aspect of social capital prove to be positively associated with political participation, then Latin Americans have a relatively high level of social capital (at least in organizational memberships, voluntarism, and networking) working in their favor as they enter the political arena. The simple Pearson correlation coefficient for the non-political organizational membership index and the political activity index in Latin America is .27, a relatively high correlation coefficient for individual-level data. The correlation coefficient for the non-political voluntarism index is higher, at .32. The social networking index, however, is considerably lower, at .12. It would seem that being

involved in non-political organizations does promote political activism, but ordinary social networking is not so important in promoting political participation in Latin America.

In sum, having higher levels of social capital, whether measured attitudinally or in terms of organizational memberships, seems to encourage political participation in Latin America, at least at the individual level. This bivariate analysis supports Putnam's thesis about the role of social capital in promoting political participation. However, a more complete analysis of the causal factors promoting political activity must include the attitudinal and resource factors discussed above along with social capital in a multivariate analysis. Moreover, some analysis of contextual factors will help to explain out national-level differences that are not explained by these socioeconomic, attitudinal, and social capital factors.

Resources, Values, Social Capital, and Participation: A Multivariate Model

Since the political attitudes, socioeconomic resources, and dimensions of social capital discussed above are by no means unrelated to each other, I conducted a multiple regression analysis of the predictors of participation to gain a clearer understanding of the relationship of political attitudes, social capital, socioeconomic resources, and contextual (institutional) factors to political participation. Because analysts of political participation have long recognized socioeconomic status variables to be strong predictors of participation, I incorporated the following variables into the model: age, gender, educational level, and self-reported income.[10] Age, education, and income level would be expected to have a positive relationship on participation: older, better educated citizens

[10] Because of measurement irregularities in two of the Latin American countries for the variable reporting the size of the city in which the respondent lives, I had to exclude that variable from the analysis.

would be expected to engage in more political activities than younger, less educated persons. Men would be expected to participate politically more than women in the male-dominated societies of Latin America. Because of the way the gender variable is coded, a negative regression coefficient indicates that men participate more.

Social capital is tapped by three variables: the non-political voluntarism index, the networking index, and social trust. The voluntarism and networking indices and social trust would be expected to have a positive impact on participation. However, because of the way the trust question is posed, we expect a negative sign on the regression coefficients for trust.

Under political attitudes, three variables asked in the WVS could tap political engagement: one's self-professed interest in politics, the amount of time spent talking about politics with others, and one's assessment of the importance of politics. Because of their high intercorrelation, I include only political interest. Greater political interest should be positively related to participation (although the coefficients in the analysis should be negative because the scale is inverse). I incorporated three variables to capture fundamental political values: one explores the respondent's orientation to change or the status quo (see Table 3 for the bivariate relationship); a second is the eleven-point left-right ideological scale; the third is the WVS four-point materialism/postmaterialism index.

I employed a successive models approach to the multiple regression analysis in an attempt to assess the relative weight of each set of explanatory variables. Likewise, I report the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) only, since my effort is largely focused on assessing the relative importance of different causal factors. I first

sought to explain political activity with the socioeconomic and demographic variables alone. As Table 6 shows, the socioeconomic and demographic variables explained little more than 4 percent of the variance in the political activity index. However, all of the variables prove to be statistically significant, and two remain so throughout the successive models: education, with one of the highest beta weights, and age.

Next I added into the model the political attitudes other than political interest (and trust, which I group with social capital). Political interest is so intuitively connected to actual political participation that I sought to exclude its effects on political participation until after assessing the impact of the other political values. The addition of the attitudinal variables other than political interest increases the explanatory power of the model only very modestly (the adjusted R^2 increases about one percent). The coefficients of the attitudinal variables are, however, statistically significant with their signs in the expected direction. Those more to the left in the ideological spectrum do participate at higher rates than those more to the right. Those holding postmaterialist values participate more than those advocating materialist norms. Those who prefer that their society undergo social change are more active than defenders of the status quo.

Table 6 about here

When we add political interest as a predictor of political activity, the model's explanatory power improves dramatically (compare the R^2 scores of columns 2 and 3). As the beta weights indicate, no other variable has as much impact on political activism as political interest, except for the voluntarism index added in later models. These findings suggest that political engagement drives political activity almost as much as any other factor.

However, adding the social capital variables increases the explanatory power of the model still further, indicating that social capital does drive political participation to a considerable extent in these four Latin American nations. Importantly, both the attitudinal dimension of social capital (interpersonal trust) and its organizational embodiment (measured by the index of organizational memberships) prove to be significant predictors of political participation. Adding trust alone has little impact on the explanatory power of the model, although the trust is a statistically significant predictor of political activism (see column 4). The beta weights suggest that non-political voluntarism (column 5) has an impact on participation rates greater than any other variable, including education and political engagement. Together these three factors prove most important for predicting political participation. When the social networking index is added to the model (column 6), it proves statistically insignificant, however. I do not report here versions of the model that substitute non-political organizational membership in place of voluntarism (because the two are highly intercorrelated, including both in the model would introduce multicollinearity and bias the coefficients). Organizational membership has an impact similar to (although slightly weaker than) voluntary work on one's political activism.

In the final columns of Table 6, the voluntarism and networking indices have been replaced by a series of dichotomous variables for each type of voluntary activity and each way of spending time with others about which an individual was asked. This final analysis allows us to ascertain whether all types of non-political voluntary work encourage political participation, or only certain types, and similarly whether certain kinds of social interaction are more likely to promote political activity. Table 6 indicates

that all forms of non-political social voluntarism influence political activity in Latin America. Of these, unpaid work for one's labor union, social welfare service agencies, and health organizations has the greatest impact of any voluntary labor on political participation. In contrast, of the forms of social networking, only spending time with members of one's church has impact on one's political activity in Latin America.

The implication of this multiple regression analysis is that social capital, especially in the form of (non-political) organizational involvement and volunteering, does promote political participation in Latin America, confirming Putnam's hypothesis. However, education and political engagement, measured by levels of interest in politics, also matter, maybe every bit as much as social capital. Because Latin Americans have moderate levels of organizational involvement (and education), by world standards, this converts to intermediate levels of political activity. Because social trust proves to be a less powerful predictor of participation, Latin Americans' low levels of trust penalize them less in terms of political activity than would be the case if their organizational memberships were equally low, comparatively.

Many studies of political participation have concluded that different modes of participation may be explained by different variables (Asher, Richardson, and Weisberg 1984). Does the global model reported in Table 6 explain the individual modes of participation subsumed in the political activism index? To assess whether the general model applies to specific forms of participation, I applied variables used in model 7 of Table 6 in a series of bivariate logistic regressions, one for each of the forms of political activity summed in the political activism index. The results are reported in Table 7, with the forms of unconventional political activity reported in the top half of the table and the

different modes of political voluntarism on the bottom half. I report the regression coefficients (which have little interpretable meaning) and their level of significance; thus we can identify the statistically significant variables.

For the five forms of unconventional political activity, political interest was a strong predictor of each, and social trust also proved to be a significant explanatory variable for all of these modes of participation except joining a boycott.[11] The latter form of political activism relies much less on person-to-person cooperative behavior, of course, so this finding is not surprising. Post-materialists and those on the left were more likely to engage in the more confrontational of these five activities—attending a demonstration, participating in an illegal strike, and occupying a building—than materialists or those on the right. Those with higher levels of education tended to undertake the less confrontational of these activities at rates greater than those of lower educational levels, but those educational differences did not carry through to the more confrontational modes of unconventional activism. Interestingly, voluntary work for non-political organizations did not seem to affect respondents' likelihood of engaging in unconventional political activism, except that those who contributed unpaid work for labor unions were more likely to sign petitions, attend demonstrations, and occupy buildings.

In contrast, voluntary work for political organizations is strongly associated with voluntary work for non-political organizations. The basic political values do not explain why people contribute voluntary labor in political activities, nor do the basic socioeconomic and demographic variables consistently predict political voluntarism.

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[11] In the logistic regression models, trust is categorized so that those who trust others=1, those who are not trusting in others=0. Hence, positive coefficients indicate that trust promotes participation.

However, some interesting and expected relationships do emerge: women volunteer more for women's and human rights (or development) organizations while men are more likely to volunteer for political parties and environmental groups. The more politically engaged are likely to volunteer for parties, human rights groups, and women's organizations, but those working with environmental concerns tend to be less interested in politics. Post-materialists are likely to devote time to environmental groups too.

A basic conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that those who are prone to join organizations and devote their time to collective endeavors will do so across many types of collective effort. Joiners and volunteers are joiners and volunteers. This point is important, though, because it indicates that where there are more joiners and volunteers, they will involve themselves in political activities as well as non-political efforts. This, of course, is the crux of Putnam's hypothesis—to promote political participation, we should be advocating all forms of social capital formation, especially organizational membership and volunteer activities. This holds true in Latin America and for a wide variety of collective effort in the region just as it does in other nations around the world.

The Importance of Context

The models reported in Table 6 mask country-by-country differences in the role of these explanatory variables in predicting political activity. Does social capital play the same role in promoting political participation in all of the Latin American countries included in this study? Table 8 would suggest not.

Table 8 about here

In Table 8, the model reported in column 7 of Table 6 is applied to each of the four Latin American countries featured in this study. Two findings from the global Latin American model apply across all of the individual countries (or nearly so): political interest is a powerful predictor of the number of political activities in which an individual engages and education is the consistent socioeconomic resource predictor of participation (except in the case of Chile). In Chile, in contrast, higher income is a significant predictor of political activity, whereas it is not significant in the other three cases. From among the particular forms of organizational voluntarism, doing unpaid work for a labor union predicts political activity more strongly and consistently across nations than any other type of non-political voluntary activity, although voluntarism in the areas of culture/arts/music/education (including parent-teacher associations) and for organizations that provide social welfare services and health services predicts political activity in three of the four countries.

Interesting contextual differences surface from the analysis shown in Table 8. For example, both Argentina's and Chile's profiles parallel what our hypotheses would lead us to expect in most ways: the better educated (Argentina) or those with higher incomes (Chile) participate more, those on the left participate more, postmaterialists are more active, and, of course, those who are more interested in politics are more politically active. That is, some of the main social, demographic, and attitudinal variables are statistically significant and the signs are in the hypothesized direction. The explanatory power of the model is also reasonably good—although better for Argentina than for Chile. The social capital variables provide additional explanatory power. The more trusting participate more and labor union membership matters in both societies.

Thereafter, the impact on political activism of which social voluntary activities one engages in differs from country to country—volunteering in sports and recreation organizations matters much in Argentina, while for Chileans working with social welfare oriented organizations and those focused on the youth seems to promote political participation.

In contrast, Mexico and Peru do not seem to match the standard profile so closely. The usual social and demographic variables do not predict political activity, except for education and, in Peru, age. Nor, in Peru, do the attitudinal variables other than political interest matter. In Mexico, one's attitude about social change does predict political activism—those more in favor of change participate more, while defenders of the status quo refrain from political activity. This finding forms an interesting parallel to the message on which Vicente Fox ran for president in 2000—change now. More than for other Latin Americans, Mexicans with a desire for change have been more inclined to participate than the defenders of the status quo. In addition, in Mexico, associational voluntarism in all manner of non-political organizations encourages political participation. To some extent these associational memberships may have provided a counterweight to the official party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI) as a mobilizer of political participation in the mid 1990s. Voluntarism matters in Peru, too, but less so than in Mexico (fewer of the forms of associational voluntarism are significant, and the overall explanatory power of the model is lower).

Context seems to matter in predicting which Latin Americans will be more inclined to political activism. By the time of this wave of the WVS, both Chile and Argentina had experienced more than a decade of democratic politics—not necessarily a

time of normalcy, but not a period in which citizens were being mobilized to counter dictatorship. In such a setting, the standard model of political participation seems to work better than in situations in which the population's attention has been focused on regime change, such as Mexico at the time during which this wave of the survey was administered (2000). In Mexico, the focus on bringing about change may well have promoted a variety of forms of associational activism, including political voluntarism.

Conclusions

The analysis reported in this paper supports the argument made by Robert Putnam that social capital is an important factor in encouraging the higher levels of political participation that we generally associate with a richer, fuller democratic experience. In Latin America, social trust and organizational involvement outside the political sphere do push individuals to be more politically active. Involvement in many kinds of organizations is effective in promoting participation, although labor unions remain the most important mobilizers of political activity. Arts/music/education associations, professional associations, and voluntary work for social service and health-related organizations also promote political activity.

In global terms, Latin America has moderate levels of non-political organizational involvement and low levels of interpersonal trust. Changing either organizational involvement (membership and voluntarism) is not a policy tool easily available to social scientists wishing to promote a more full democratic life in Latin America. Changing levels of interpersonal trust is an even more difficult, maybe impossible, endeavor, since it goes to deeply held attitudes about the relationship of the individual to the rest of society. Our hope must be that a long period of stable democracy will build social trust

and encourage the associational activism that we identify with social capital.

APPENDIX

Questions as Asked on the World Values Survey

Political Activity: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it." The choices then given are: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories.

Organizational Membership: "Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?" The choices then given are: social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; church or religious organization; sport or recreation organization; art, music, educational or cultural activities; labor union; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; environmental organization; professional association; youth work (scouts, guides, youth clubs); peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health; any other voluntary organization.

Voluntary Activities: Following the previous question: "And for which, if any, are you doing unpaid voluntary work?" The same list as organizational membership is offered.

Social Trust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"

Political Interest: "How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not at all interested?"

Left-Right Placement: "In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 0=far left, 10=far right"

Orientation to Change: Which of the following best describes your own opinion:

1. The entire way our society is organized must by radically changed by revolutionary action.
2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms.
3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.

Education Level: "What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type

6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without degree
9. University-level education, with degree"

Income Level: "Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions." Income is then coded into categories by deciles for each society: 1=lowest decile, 10=highest decile.

Size of Town:

1. Under 2,000
2. 2,000 - 5,000
3. 5 - 10,000
4. 10 - 20,000
5. 20 - 50,000
6. 50 - 100,000
7. 100 - 500,000
8. 500,000 and more

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Table 1: Political Activity Index

	Political Activity Index		Political Activity Index
Latin America		**Former Communist Societies**	
Argentina	0.54	Albania	0.87
Chile	0.69	Belarus	0.37
Mexico	0.45	Bosnia And Herzegovina	0.50
Peru	0.69	Bulgaria	0.40
		Croatia	0.59
Wealthy Democracies		Czech Republic	1.12
Austria	0.94	Estonia	0.39
Belgium	1.44	Hungary	0.28
Canada	1.44	Latvia	0.50
Denmark	1.47	Lithuania	0.43
Finland	0.93	Montenegro	0.71
France	1.46	Poland	0.47
Germany	0.92	Macedonia	0.86
Greece	1.71	Moldova	0.67
Iceland	1.05	Romania	0.32
Ireland	1.11	Russian Federation	0.39
Italy	1.20	Serbia	0.81
Japan	0.87	Slovakia	0.97
Luxembourg	1.18	Slovenia	0.68
Netherlands	1.37	Ukraine	0.40
Portugal	0.49		
Spain	0.75	**Africa**	
Sweden	1.85	South Africa	1.09
United Kingdom	1.43	Uganda	0.91
United States Of America	1.74	Tanzania	1.59
		Zimbabwe	0.31
Asia			
Bangladesh	1.63		
India	1.13		
Philippines	0.67		
Viet Nam	1.04		

Source: World Values Survey, 1999-2001 wave.

Table 2: Levels of Participation of Latin Americans in Political Activities in Comparative Perspective

	Voluntarism						Unconventional Political Activism				
	Political Parties	Local Community Action	Human Rights/ Development	Environ-mentalism	Women's Groups	Peace Move-ment	Sign Petition	Join Boycott	Attend Demon-stration	Join Illegal Strike	Occupy Building
Argentina	3.1	2.7	0.3	1.4	0.7	0.3	22.7	2.0	13.2	5.3	1.9
Brazil	--	--	--	--	--	--	47.1	6.4	24.8	6.5	2.7
Chile	1.8	3.7	1.6	2.0	4.5	2.2	19.9	5.3	15.9	8.9	4.2
Mexico	3.5	4.2	1.4	3.0	3.3	3.0	16.8	2.1	3.7	2.5	2.0
Peru	3.3	4.2	1.6	2.2	4.9	0.4	22.4	7.7	17.0	4.0	1.7
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	--	22.7	2.4	9.7	2.4	2.6
Uruguay	--	--	--	--	--	--	35.5	4.0	5.0	10.2	7.6
Colombia	--	--	--	--	--	--	18.9	7.7	11.5	4.9	1.3
U.S.	7.0	7.2	2.9	8.5	8.2	2.0	81.1	25.6	21.4	6.0	4.1
Canada	2.7	5.1	2.5	4.4	4.5	1.0	73.3	20.5	19.5	7.1	3.0
Japan	1.2	0.4	0.3	1.2	1.2	0.7	63.2	8.4	12.9	2.7	0.1
Spain	1.3	1.7	1.4	1.1	0.8	0.5	27.5	5.8	26.6	8.2	2.7

Source: World Values Survey, 1999-2001 wave.

Table 3: Bivariate Relationships between Social Structural Variables and Participation in Latin America

	Unconventional Activism Index	Political Activism	Political Voluntarism Index	Non-Political Voluntarism Index	Voluntarism Index (all)	Political Organization Index	Organizational Index (all)	Non-Political Organizational Index	Networking Index
Size of Town	**0.084**	0.038	**-0.059**	-0.021	**-0.042**	-0.007	0.006	0.015	**-0.084**
	(3215)	(2092)	(2494)	(2494)	(2494)	(3694)	(3694)	(3694)	(3546)
Income	**0.083**	**0.096**	0.019	**0.046**	**0.041**	**0.060**	**0.104**	**0.110**	**0.035**
	(5358)	(4414)	(5127)	(5127)	(5127)	(6132)	(6132)	(6132)	(5803)
Subjective Social Class (inverse)	**-0.049**	**-0.080**	**-0.047**	**-0.112**	**-0.101**	**-0.071**	**-0.124**	**-0.132**	**-0.097**
	(5647)	(4530)	(5284)	(5284)	(5284)	(6475)	(6475)	(6475)	(6138)
Education	**0.166**	**0.182**	**0.040**	**0.129**	**0.110**	**0.085**	**0.178**	**0.201**	**0.213**
	(5807)	(4684)	(5507)	(5507)	(5507)	(6707)	(6707)	(6707)	(6346)
Marital Status	0.004	0.002	**-0.028**	**0.043**	0.018	-0.007	**0.039**	**0.061**	**0.142**
	(5798)	(4677)	(5504)	(5504)	(5504)	(6701)	(6701)	(6701)	(6340)
Age	**0.030**	0.026	**0.032**	-0.011	0.007	**0.024**	-0.009	**-0.029**	**-0.165**
	(5808)	(4685)	(5511)	(5511)	(5511)	(6711)	(6711)	(6711)	(6349)
Sex	**-0.065**	**-0.042**	0.016	-0.011	-0.001	-0.022	**-0.042**	**-0.046**	**-0.166**
	(5812)	(4689)	(5516)	(5516)	(5516)	(6716)	(6716)	(6716)	(6354)

First-order Pearson correlation coefficients reported. Coefficients in bold are significant at the .05 level. Number of cases in parentheses. Standard weighting applied

Table 4: Political Attitudes and Activism in Latin America

	Political Activism Index Number of Modes of Participation						
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5 or more**	**Total**
Order vs. Change							
Society must be Radically Changed	8	8	9	10	14	21	8
Society can be Gradually Improved by Reforms	73	75	71	75	71	69	73
Society must be Valiantly Defended	19	18	20	15	14	10	19
Ideology							
Left	35	27	26	34	32	48	33
Center	46	52	53	46	54	36	47
Right	19	21	21	21	14	16	20
Post-Materialist Index							
Materialist	26	19	22	14	16	19	23
Mixed	58	63	54	60	62	33	59
Post-Materialist	16	18	25	26	22	47	18
Interest in Politics							
Very Interested	5	9	20	15	36	27	8
Somewhat Interested	22	29	33	40	25	27	25
Not Very Interested	33	35	28	29	28	28	33
Not At All Interested	40	26	19	16	11	18	34
Trust							
Most People can be Trusted	15	20	21	26	34	24	17
Need to be very Careful	85	80	79	74	66	76	83

Source: World Values Survey, 1999-2001 wave.

Table 5: Social Capital: Trust, Non-Political Voluntarism, and Social Networking

	Trust	Volunteer	Network		Trust	Volunteer	Network
Latin America				**Former Communist Societies**			
Argentina	15.4	.24	4.85	Albania	24.4	.72	5.35
Chile	22.8	.53	4.64	Belarus	41.9	.18	5.38
Mexico	21.4	.50	5.48	Bosnia	15.8	.22	5.82
Peru	10.7	.56	6.59	Bulgaria	26.9	.16	4.33
				Croatia	18.4	.25	6.29
Wealthy Democracies				Czech Republic	23.9	.37	4.78
Austria	33.9	.32	5.65	Estonia	22.9	.19	5.53
Belgium	30.7	.46	5.28	Hungary	21.8	.19	--
Canada	38.8	.78	5.96	Latvia	17.1	.20	--
Denmark	66.5	.41	6.07	Lithuania	24.9	.12	3.60
Finland	58.0	.47	5.81	Montenegro	33.7	.19	6.12
France	22.2	.26	4.76	Poland	18.9	.15	--
Germany	34.7	.21	6.06	Macedonia	13.5	.42	5.68
Greece	23.8	.57	5.87	Moldova	14.7	.55	5.31
Iceland	41.1	.42	5.51	Romania	10.2	.16	4.46
Ireland	35.2	.41	6.78	Russia	23.7	.07	3.81
Italy	32.6	.35	5.25	Serbia	18.8	.10	6.25
Japan	43.0	.20	4.35	Slovakia	15.7	.56	-
Luxembourg	26.0	.43	--	Slovenia	21.7	.36	5.72
Netherlands	59.8	.71	6.21	Ukraine	27.2	.11	4.42
Portugal	10.0	.13	6.04				
Spain	36.2	.17	5.49	**Africa**			
Sweden	66.3	.84	6.31	South Africa	11.7	.85	6.59
United Kingdom	29.8	.62	5.59	Uganda	7.6	1.23	8.20
United States	35.8	1.37	7.19	Tanzania	8.1	2.24	--
				Zimbabwe	11.9	.78	7.16
Asia							
Bangladesh	23.6	--	6.73				
India	41.0	.66	6.52				
Philippines	8.4	.77	--				
Viet Nam	41.3	1.21	5.70				

Source: World Values Survey, 1999-2001 wave.

Table 6: Multivariate Model Predicting Political Activism in Latin America

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Demographic and Socioeconomic								
Age	0.10***	0.10***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.09***
Sex	-0.03*	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01
Income	0.04**	0.03*	0.04**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03*	0.02
Education	0.20***	0.18***	0.14***	0.14***	0.11***	0.11***	0.10***	0.09***
Attitudes								
L-R Self Positioning		-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.08***
Order vs. Change		-0.04**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Post-Materialist Index		0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
Interested In Politics			-0.20***	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.16***
Most People Can Be Trusted				-0.07***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
Non-Political Voluntarism Index					0.28***	0.28***		
Networking Index						-0.01		
Voluntarism								
Welfare Services							0.10***	0.10***
Church/Mosque/Synagogue							0.05***	0.07***
Cultural Activities							0.09***	0.09***
Labor Unions							0.10***	0.10***
Professional Associations							0.08***	0.08***
Youth Work							0.06***	0.06***
Sports or Recreation							0.04***	0.04**
Health Organization							0.10***	0.10***
Networking: Spend Time Weekly								
with Parents								-0.01
with friends								0.02
with work colleagues								0.03
with fellow church members								0.07***
with sports/recreation friends								0.03*
R^2	.042	.056	.092	.096	.17	.17	.180	.185
N	4413	3712	3712	3712	3712	3712	3712	3712

Ordinary least squares regression; pairwise deletion employed.
***significant at the .01 level; **significant at the .05 level; *significant at the .10 level.

Table 7: Determinants of Participation in Distinct Modes of Participation in Four Latin American Nations

	Unconventional Political Activism									
	Signed Petition		**Join Boycott**		**Attend Demonstration**		**Unlawful Strike**		**Occupy Building**	
	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.
Constant	**-0.91**	0.059	**-2.55**	0.003	0.45	0.416	**-2.29**	0.007	**-2.97**	0.011
Age	**0.02**	0.000	**0.01**	0.060	**0.01**	0.000	**0.02**	0.000	0.00	0.718
Sex (Male)	0.03	0.758	0.00	0.995	0.13	0.182	0.05	0.724	0.30	0.178
Income	**0.06**	0.000	-0.02	0.584	0.00	0.878	**0.05**	0.079	**0.09**	0.032
Education	**0.13**	0.000	**0.23**	0.000	**0.11**	0.000	0.05	0.219	0.03	0.587
Left-Right scale	**-0.05**	0.002	-0.03	0.403	**-0.15**	0.000	**-0.19**	0.000	**-0.15**	0.001
Post-Materialism Index	0.11	0.115	0.11	0.412	**0.28**	0.000	**0.33**	0.005	**0.55**	0.002
Trust	**0.29**	0.005	0.27	0.159	**0.24**	0.048	**0.50**	0.003	**0.64**	0.008
Political Interest	**-0.34**	0.000	**-0.33**	0.000	**-0.45**	0.000	**-0.38**	0.000	**-0.28**	0.014
Welfare Organization	0.06	0.738	0.08	0.822	0.28	0.192	0.47	0.104	0.45	0.310
Church Organization	-0.14	0.220	0.10	0.633	0.02	0.882	-0.02	0.930	-0.26	0.408
Cultural Organization	**0.53**	0.000	-0.03	0.900	**0.34**	0.038	0.08	0.746	0.28	0.400
Labor Union	**0.47**	0.048	0.19	0.661	**1.10**	0.000	-0.01	0.976	**0.85**	0.067
Professional Assn	-0.14	0.569	0.37	0.314	0.12	0.662	-0.46	0.318	-0.52	0.424
Youth groups	-0.08	0.680	0.42	0.185	0.29	0.180	0.27	0.405	0.31	0.485
Sports/Recreation groups	-0.07	0.642	0.01	0.978	-0.04	0.808	0.25	0.306	-0.38	0.332
Health Organizations	0.23	0.262	0.21	0.567	-0.07	0.779	-0.01	0.982	0.38	0.443
-2 Log likelihood		3681.31		1338.47		2824.57		1499.85		802.79
Nagelkerke R Square		0.10		0.07		0.13		0.09		0.08
Percentage Correct		77.91		95.02		85.33		94.29		97.48
N		3712		3746		3756		3747		3735

Binominal logistic regression coefficients reported. Pairwise deletion employed.

Table 7: Determinants of Participation in Distinct Modes of Participation in Four Latin American Nations (continued)

	Political Voluntarism											
	Political Parties		Local political Activism		Human Rights or Development		Environmental Organization		Women's Organizations		Peace Movement	
	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.	B	Sig.
Constant	**1.62**	0.058	**3.48**	0.000	**2.82**	0.028	-1.12	0.238	**4.17**	0.000	**2.30**	0.066
Age	**0.01**	0.062	**0.01**	0.031	**0.02**	0.036	0.00	0.813	0.00	0.486	0.00	0.735
Sex (Male)	**0.65**	0.002	-0.25	0.169	**-0.56**	0.097	**0.59**	0.012	**-2.47**	0.000	-0.19	0.528
Income	0.05	0.165	0.00	0.971	-0.07	0.277	**0.07**	0.095	**-0.07**	0.088	0.07	0.220
Education	0.07	0.133	-0.06	0.161	0.08	0.352	**0.10**	0.082	**-0.08**	0.090	**-0.22**	0.008
Left-Right scale	-0.04	0.356	0.01	0.830	**-0.13**	0.062	0.03	0.552	-0.04	0.331	0.07	0.276
Post-Materialism Index	0.22	0.176	0.19	0.205	0.09	0.746	**0.34**	0.067	-0.10	0.540	0.31	0.212
Trust	0.18	0.447	-0.34	0.150	-0.34	0.417	0.19	0.467	-0.34	0.191	0.22	0.519
Political Interest	**-1.05**	0.000	-0.11	0.231	**-0.30**	0.082	**0.21**	0.079	**-0.20**	0.050	0.11	0.484
Welfare Organization	**1.03**	0.001	**1.43**	0.000	**1.28**	0.001	**0.94**	0.006	**0.99**	0.001	**1.23**	0.001
Church Organization	**0.47**	0.045	**0.86**	0.000	**0.70**	0.045	**0.85**	0.000	**1.13**	0.000	**0.97**	0.002
Cultural Organization	0.32	0.256	**0.68**	0.006	**1.55**	0.000	**0.85**	0.003	**0.91**	0.000	0.56	0.156
Labor Union	**1.11**	0.002	**1.26**	0.000	0.33	0.590	**0.87**	0.044	**0.88**	0.060	**1.09**	0.045
Professional Assn	0.30	0.449	**1.17**	0.001	**1.40**	0.003	0.37	0.388	0.04	0.936	**1.14**	0.029
Youth groups	0.49	0.162	**0.75**	0.015	0.00	0.996	0.30	0.451	0.33	0.355	**0.79**	0.080
Sports/Recreation groups	-0.40	0.146	**0.52**	0.050	**0.97**	0.015	0.21	0.515	**1.33**	0.000	**1.02**	0.007
Health Organizations	**0.65**	0.066	**0.92**	0.001	**1.48**	0.000	**1.45**	0.000	0.51	0.109	**1.31**	0.001
-2 Log likelihood		880.48		1102.75		375.73		757.97		933.22		471.29
Nagelkerke R Square		0.23		0.19		0.31		0.16		0.24		0.23
Percentage Correct		96.82		96.11		98.75		97.62		96.50		98.51
N		3891		3891		3891		3891		3891		3891

Binominal logistic regression coefficients reported. Pairwise deletion employed.

Table 8: Multivariate Model of Political Activism in Four Latin American Nations

	Argentina	Chile	Mexico	Peru
Demographic and Socioeconomic				
Age	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.13***
Sex	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.00
Income	0.02	0.11***	-0.04	0.01
Education	0.19***	0.01	0.07*	0.11***
Attitudes				
L-R Self Positioning	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.01	-0.04
Order vs. Change	-0.01	0.02	-0.06**	0.00
Post-Materialist Index	0.07**	0.12***	-0.04	0.01
Interested In Politics	-0.20***	-0.18***	-0.07**	-0.19***
Most People Can Be Trusted	-0.11***	-0.09***	0.01	-0.01
Voluntarism				
Welfare Services	0.04	0.11***	0.13***	0.07**
Church/Mosque/Synagogue	0.06**	0.02	0.14***	0.02
Cultural Activities	0.02	0.07*	0.13**	0.13***
Labor Unions	0.20***	0.10***	0.08***	0.08***
Professional Associations	0.05	0.03	0.19**	0.03
Youth Work	0.00	0.11***	0.07**	0.04
Sports or Recreation	0.12***	0.01	0.08***	0.01
Health Organization	0.14***	0.01	0.16***	0.10***
R^2	0.297	0.185	0.259	0.133
N	784	922	856	1144

Ordinary least square regression; pairwise deletion employed.
***significant at the .01 level; **significant at the .05 level; *significant at the .10 level.